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PROSTITUTES, ORPHANS, AND ENTREPRENEURS:
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF
GHANA’S GIRL CHILD KAYAYEI ON PUBLIC POLICY
SHERYL BUSKE*
ABSTRACT
For a variety of reasons, including the growing disparity in
resources and opportunities between Ghana’s mostly rural North
and its urban South, the numbers and patterns of internal migration
have changed dramatically over the last twenty years. Historically
the province of men, and later women on a temporary basis that was
tied to the rainy seasons, young girls between ten and sixteen years
of age now make up the majority of the North-South migrants.
The lives of these girl migrants, who live and work in Ghana’s
markets as porters, known locally as kayayoo, are complex and mul-
tifaceted. They endure great hardships and are exposed to increas-
ing risks as they struggle to survive while living and working on the
streets. As more and more girls travel to the southern cities from
their homes in the North, and fewer and fewer of them return on a
permanent basis, the number of girl porters on the street at any
given time is growing. This growth has had several consequences.
The presence of more and more girls on the streets has created
greater competition for everything—from jobs to sleeping spaces.
Another consequence has been the change in the public perception
of the girls. In the past, when the porters were mostly adult women
and their numbers were fairly constant, they generally remained
below the public’s radar. More recently, however, as young girls out-
number adult women working in the markets and when there are
not enough jobs to go around, when more girls are turning to prosti-
tution to make ends meet and when the overall scarcity of resources
has given rise to greater and more frequent violence, the public has
begun to take notice of the girls.
The Ghanaian public has responded to their swelling numbers
and increasing visibility in different ways. To some, the girl porters
* Sheryl Buske, Assistant Professor at Charlotte School of Law, served as a Fulbright
Scholar to Ghana during the 2011–2012 academic year and spent countless hours in the
markets with the kayayei girls. Immeasurable thanks to the Fulbright Scholar program
for making this research possible, to Sister Olivia at the Street Children’s Project in
Kumasi for her guidance, wisdom and humor, and for always asking “So what?”, to fellow
Fulbrighter Kelli Summers for technical assistance, and enormous gratitude and respect
for all the girls who allowed me into their lives and trusted me with their stories.
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are dirty, street criminals to be avoided. To others, they are victims
of circumstances and deserving of benevolence and protection. To
others still, the girl porters are no different than any other person
who makes a rational decision to relocate in an attempt to improve
their situation and they are therefore not entitled to any special
treatment or deference.
In the fifty-plus years since its independence, Ghana has devel-
oped public policies across a range of critical areas. Three of these
areas—child labor, education, and health care—are particularly rel-
evant to the girl porters and reflect a range of punitive, protectionist,
and laissez-faire social policy models. This Article argues that the
kayayei girls do not benefit from these key public policies because, in
part, the government officials who determine the shape and reach
of public policy, and the frontline people who are tasked with its im-
plementation and administration, are the very people who view the
girls as prostitutes, orphans, or entrepreneurs. Quite simply, numer-
ous problems in the sprawling Ministries system, including the lack
of systematic oversight, inconsistent practices across districts, lim-
ited resources, and insufficient personnel training have resulted in
a system in which individuals exercise enormous deference in public
policy implementation. The consequence for the girls, then, is that
more often than not whether they can access the benefits of public
policies depends on one person’s perception of girl porters. It is no sur-
prise then that, because much of the public’s perception of the girls
is negative or indifferent, the girls have largely failed to benefit from
public policies.
INTRODUCTION
I. INTERNAL MIGRATION AND THE HEAD PORTERS OF GHANA
A. Internal Migration in Ghana and the Historical Practice
of the Kayayei
B. The New Reality of the Kayayei Girls
1. Why They Go
2. Their Life in the City
3. Why They Stay
II. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF KAYAYEI AS “STREET KIDS”
A. As Deviants: Prostitutes and Thieves
B. As Victims: Orphaned and Exploited
C. As Entrepreneurs: Independent Agents
III. GHANA’S PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSE
A. Public Policy Models
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B. Kayayei and Public Policies: A Mix of Punitive,
Protectionist, and Laissez-Faire Policy Models
and the Obstacles to Implementation
1. Child Labor Laws and Policy
2. Education Policy
3. Health Care Policy
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
For a variety of reasons, including the disparity in resources
and opportunities between Ghana’s mostly rural North and its
urban South, the numbers and patterns of internal migration have
changed greatly over the last twenty years. Historically the province
of men,1 and later women on a temporary basis that was tied to the
rainy seasons, young girls between ten and sixteen years of age now
make up the majority of the North-South migrants.2
The lives of these girl migrants, who live and work in Ghana’s
sprawling markets as porters, known locally as kayayei,3 are com-
plex and multifaceted. They endure great hardships and are exposed
to increasing risks as they struggle to survive while living and work-
ing on the streets. As more and more girls travel to the southern
cities from their homes in the North, and fewer and fewer of them
return on a permanent basis, the number of girl porters on the
street at any given time is growing.4 This growth has had several
1. Stephen O. Kwankye et al., Independent North-South Child Migration in
Ghana: The Decision Making Process 11 (Dev. Research Ctr. on Migration, Globalisation
& Poverty, Working Paper T-29, 2009), available at http://www.migrationdrc.org
/publications/working_papers/WP-T29.pdf (noting that head porterage in Ghana was
initially a “male domain”).
2. Stephen O. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies of Independent Child Migrants
from Northern Ghana to Southern Cities, 24 (Dev. Research Ctr. on Migration, Glob-
alisation & Poverty, Working Paper T-23, 2007) [hereinafter Kwankye et al., Coping
Strategies], available at http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/working_papers/WP
-T23.pdf (noting that the presence of younger girls migrating to the South is a “relatively
recent phenomenon”).
3. “Kayayei” is the plural form of “Kayayoo,” a term which is used by the Ga people,
a Ghanaian ethnic group, to describe the girls and women who work as porters in the
urban markets by carrying loads on their heads in large metal pans or bowls for a fee.
Muriel Adjubi Yeboah & Kwame AppiahYeboah, An Examination of the Cultural and
Socio-Economic Profiles of Porters in Accra, Ghana, 18 NORDIC J. AFR. STUD. 1, 2 n.1
(2009). The term “kayayoo” itself reflects the very history of the kayayei: “kaya” is the
Hausa word for “load,” which reflected the early dominance of men as porters, and the
relatively recent addition of “yoo” rendered the word female. Kwankye et al., Coping
Strategies, supra note 2, at 8.
4. See Mariama Awumbila, Internal Migration, Vulnerability and Female Porters
in Accra, Ghana, POPULATION ASS’N OF AM.: 2007 ANN. MEETING PROGRAM 1–2 (2007),
available at http://paa2007.princeton.edu/papers/70865.
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consequences. The presence of more and more girls has created
greater competition for everything—from jobs to sleeping spaces.
Another consequence has been the change in the public perception
of the girls. In the past, when the porters were mostly adult women
and their numbers were fairly constant, they were largely invisible
to the public—just another aspect of urban living. More recently,
however, as young girls outnumber adult women working in the
market and when there are not enough jobs to go around, when
more girls are turning to prostitution to make ends meet and when
the overall scarcity of resources has given rise to greater and more
frequent violence, the public has begun to take notice of the girls.
Drawing on the author’s own empirical research as a Fulbright
Scholar in Ghana,5 and that of others, Part I of this Article begins
with an overview of the history of internal migration and the histor-
ical practice of head portering in Ghana before moving on to a brief
discussion of the current practice of head portering among adoles-
cent and young girls. Part II takes up a discussion of the public
perception of the porters. Part III describes specific child labor, edu-
cation, and health care public policies. The Article then argues that
the views of the government officials who determine the shape and
reach of public policy, and the frontline people who are tasked with
its implementation and administration, drastically limit policy im-
plementation with respect to kayayei girls due to individual biases
of the girls as criminals, victims, and entrepreneurs. Quite simply,
numerous problems in the sprawling Ministries system, including
the lack of systematic oversight, inconsistent practices across dis-
tricts, limited resources, and insufficient personnel training have
resulted in a system in which individuals are given enormous defer-
ence in public policy implementation. The consequence for the girls,
then, is that more often than not whether they can access the benefits
intended by public policies depends on one person’s perception of
5. Over the course of the Fulbright Appointment, the author conducted three major
surveys, with the help of translators, in Kumasi, Ghana. The Community Survey (1119
respondents) focused on public perception of the kayayei girls. The goal of the Community
Survey was to obtain an understanding of what the general public thinks about the
growing presence of young girls in the markets working as kayayei. A second survey, the
Kayayei Survey (737 respondents), explored the reasons the girls migrate to the cities and
what their life is like once they arrive. A third survey, the Parenting Survey (231 respon-
dents), focused exclusively on kayayei who have a child or have been pregnant. The goal
of this survey was to explore the special situation of pregnant and parenting kayayei. In
addition to the formal surveys, the author conducted focus groups with small groups of
girls; the focus groups were informal and topics were determined by the girls. In addition,
the author spent considerable time at the Street Children Project’s Drop-In Center talk-
ing with the girls and the NGO staff. Finally, much of the author’s understanding of the
daily lives of the kayayei girls came from days and days spent in the streets with them
as they went about their normal routines.
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girl porters. It is no surprise, then, that because much of the public’s
perception of the girls is negative or indifferent, the girls have largely
failed to benefit from public policies.
I. INTERNAL MIGRATION AND THE HEAD PORTERS OF GHANA
Internal migration in Ghana has changed drastically in the last
twenty years or so. Migrants have gone from being primarily men
to adolescent girls in search of jobs as kayayei.6 The experience of
the girls on the streets has also changed dramatically. What was
once a temporary situation with controlled risks is now a permanent
situation for a growing number of the girls who face daily challenges
to simply surviving.
A. Internal Migration in Ghana and the Historical
Practice of the Kayayei
Intra-country migration, from the rural northern regions (the
Northern Region, the Upper East Region and the Upper West Region)
to the urban southern regions,7 has always existed in Ghana.8 As far
back as the British colonial period, and stretching through to the
current time, the northern regions have largely been viewed as the
source of labor necessary for the South.9 More recently even, since
Ghana’s independence in 1957,10 the post-colonial government’s policy
of concentrating resources in the southern urban regions has re-
sulted in significant imbalances in the development between the
6. See infra Part I.A–B.
7. Ghana is divided into ten regions, including: the Volta Region, the Eastern Region,
the Greater Accra Region, the Upper East Region, the Central Region, the Western Region,
the Ashanti Region, the Brong-Ahafo Region, the Northern Region, and the Upper West
Region. K.A. TWUM-BAAH ET AL., GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., GHANA CHILD LABOUR SURVEY
1 (2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/download.do?type=document&id
=690 (explaining that the ten administrative regions are then “further divided into 110
districts, which are the basic units of administration”).
8. For a detailed discussion of the history of internal migration in Ghana, see
Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 6–7; Stephen O. Kwankye, Indepen-
dent North-South Child Migration as a Parental Investment in Northern Ghana, 18
POPULATION, SPACE & PLACE 535, 535–50 (2012) [hereinafter Kwankye, Migration—
Parental Investment], available at http://iussp2009.princeton.edu/papers/90834; see also
Kwankye et al., supra note 1; Awumbila, supra note 4, at 1.
9. Awumbila, supra note 4, at 1; Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2,
at 6 (noting that the North was, and is, the “labour reserve” of the South); Ann M.
Oberhauser & Muriel A. Yeboah, Heavy Burdens: Gendered Livelihood Strategies of
Porters in Accra, Ghana, 32 SING. J. TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY 22, 23 (2011) (stating that
current migration patterns have “historical roots” in the colonial era when the North was
considered a labour reserve).
10. The World Factbook: Ghana, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the
-world-factbook/geos/gh.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
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North and South.11 As a result, very little effort or resources have
been invested in developing the North.12 Schools and hospitals have
suffered in particular.13 In contrast, and at the same time, significant
efforts and resources have been invested in developing the South.14
One of the consequences to the southern development at the expense
of the North is the high concentration of poverty in the northern re-
gions, the highest in the country, which has, not surprisingly, directly
contributed to the increasing rates of North-to-South migration.15
Notably, the increase in the depth and breadth of poverty in the
North has occurred even while the poverty levels across the country
as a whole have decreased.16
Not only have the numbers of North-to-South migrants looking
for better opportunities increased dramatically, but changes in mi-
gration patterns are also evident. Historically, it was almost exclu-
sively Ghanaian men who traveled from the rural North to the urban
South in search of employment.17 By the early 1990s, as conditions
continued to deteriorate in the North, women joined the long line of
people going south in search of better opportunities.18
In Ghana, women have traditionally been “highly economically
active,” most significantly in the informal markets.19 Once in the
cities, the women generally join the kayayei workforce because it
requires very little initial investment.20 As part of the informal labor
force, the kayayei are self-employed. The women work in the markets
carrying goods, in large metal pans on their heads, in and out on
11. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 5–6; see also Kwankye,
Migration—Parental Investment, supra note 8, at 535–36 (noting the historic “spatial
imbalance in development” in Ghana).
12. Awumbila, supra note 4, at 1; see also Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra
note 2, at 5–6 (noting that government development priorities have been “skewed” in
favor of the South).
13. Ernest Harsch, Closing Ghana’s National Poverty Gap: North-South Disparities
Challenge Attainment of Millenium Development Goals, U.N. AFR. RENEWAL (Oct. 2008),
available at http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2008/closing-ghana%E2
%80%99s-national-poverty-gap.
14. Awumbila, supra note 4, at 1; see also UNICEF, CHILDREN IN GHANA 23 (2009)
(noting statistics from the Ghana Statistical Service show that although poverty declined
across the country, it actually increased in the three northern regions).
15. Awumbila, supra note 4, at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1–2.
18. ERIC BEAUCHEMIN, CATHOLIC ACTION FOR ST. CHILDREN & UNICEF, THE EXODUS:
THE GROWING MIGRATION OF CHILDREN FROM GHANA’S RURAL AREAS TO THE URBAN
CENTRE 1 (Dec. 1998–Mar. 1999), available at http://www.streetchildren.org.uk/_uploads
/Publications/4.The_Exodus_-_The_Growing_Migration_of_Children_From_Ghana%E2
%80%99s_Rural_Areas.pdf; see also Awumbila, supra note 4, at 1–2.
19. Seema Agarwal et al., Bearing the Weight: The Kayayoo, Ghana’s Working Girl
Child, 40 INT’L SOC. WORK, 245, 245 (1997).
20. Id. at 245–46.
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foot. Several factors contribute to the need for human transport, as
opposed to moving goods via trucks and other vehicles.21 First, for
example, the human congestion of the markets makes vehicle traffic
very difficult and slow.22 Second, because much of what is bought
and sold in the markets is for resale by other petty traders, the
loads tend to be bigger and heavier than the average customer is
interested in carrying, but still too small to require a van or truck
for transport.23 Third, the kayayei system allows the customer to
keep their goods in sight at all times which is believed to prevent
theft.24 Finally, many of the markets have developed and sprawled
across the land in rabbit warrens of narrow alleyways, tunnels, and
steep stair passages which make vehicle traffic impossible.25 In total,
these factors likely mean that the porters will be a market necessity
for the foreseeable future.26
B. The New Reality of the Kayayei Girls
More and more the female migrants traveling south in search
of kaya jobs are young girls.27 The earliest waves of the girls tended
to be older adolescents who traveled during the rainy seasons with
the intention of working in the markets short-term and then return-
ing to their northern villages after they earned some money.28 Re-
cently, however, girls as young as eight years old are making the
trips south.29 Equally worrying, they are staying longer in the cities,
and many never return home.30 There is much to be said about the
daily reality of the kayayei girls, however, that discussion is outside
the scope of this Article. Instead, the following brief overview of their
day-to-day lives is intended as background and context for the dis-
cussions that follow.31
21. Id.
22. Id. at 246.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For example, the Kejetia Central Market in Kumasi, often described as the largest
open-air market in West Africa, is reported to cover over twelve hectares and have more
than ten-thousand traders. Kejetia Market, GHANA NATION, http://www.ghananation.com
/tourism/Kejetia-Market.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
26. Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 246.
27. Awumbila, supra note 4, at 1–2; see also Kwankye, Migration—Parental Investment,
supra note 8, at 535 (describing the north-south migration of children as a “relatively
new development”).
28. Awumbila, supra note 4, at 3.
29. Id. at 2.
30. Interview with Sister Olivia, Director, Street Children’s Project, Kumasi, Ghana
(Nov. 3, 2011) (on file with author); see also Beauchemin, supra note 18, at 30–31.
31. For a detailed discussion about the day-to-day lives of kayayei, see Agarwal et al.,
supra note 19; James Adu Opare, Kayayei: The Women Head Porters of Southern Ghana,
18 J. SOC. DEV. AFR. 33, 33–48 (2003).
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1. Why They Go
The reasons behind individual girls’ migration to the South for
kaya work are as varied as the girls themselves. Poverty is often
cited as the catch-all reason.32 It is certainly true that most of the
girls come from poor families, but poverty alone does not explain
why the girls migrate. There are, after all, lots of very poor families
whose daughters do not go south to work in the markets.33 What,
then, accounts for the difference? It is poverty plus something else.34
Poverty alone, without more, is generally not enough to cause chil-
dren to move to the streets. For example, researchers in Tanzania
have identified the “something else” as abuse in the home, or the
death of a caretaker.35 In the context of Ghana’s kayayei girls, “some-
thing else” includes: parental requirement, escaping abusive families,
“bright lights syndrome,” and the “fostering” system.36
Parental Requirement: Sending their daughters south to work
in the southern markets is a common “coping strategy” for poor
families.37 For some parents, it is a “strategic economic investment”
against poverty.38 Sending the girls to the markets accomplishes two
key things: parents no longer must bear the cost of the departed girl,
and parents usually receive some remittance from their daughter’s
earnings.39 Indeed, in a survey by the author of 737 kayayei girls
(Kayayei Survey), the most common reason given by the girls for
migration to the markets was “parental requirement.”40
32. Christiana Kangsangbata, Streetism and Child Labour in the Wa Municipality
of Ghana: A Gender Analysis of Drivers, 1 STUD. GENDER & DEV. AFR. 14, 19 (2008) (noting
poverty is “known to be a major cause of child labour”).
33. See KAMAL FAHMI, BEYOND THE VICTIM: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF EMPOWERING
CAIRO’S STREET CHILDREN 119 (2007) (arguing that poverty and family dysfunction, with-
out more, fail to explain why the “vast majority” of children in poor, dysfunctional fam-
ilies don’t end up on the streets).
34. HANNAH JOHNSON ET AL., MKOMBOZI CTR. FOR ST. CHILDREN, RESPONSES TO
CHILD VULNERABILITY—WHY DO CHILDREN MIGRATE TO THE STREETS IN TANZANIA? 6–7
(2005), available at http://mkombozi.org/publications/research_report/2005_09_research
_report_child_vulnerability.pdf.
35. Id. at 7.
36. See infra Part I.B.1.
37. Kwankye, Migration—Parental Investment, supra note 8, at 535–36; see also
Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 247 (noting that many girls are sent to the southern
markets specifically to “undertake the kaya business”); JULIETTE TUAKLI ET AL., WORLD
EDUC. GHANA, SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF VULNERABLE CHILDREN IN GHANA 23 (2006),
available at http://ghana.worlded.org/Docs/ghana_vulnerability_study_jun06.pdf (noting
that parental expectations are the “driving force” behind girls going to work).
38. Kwankye, Migration—Parental Investment, supra note 8, at 536.
39. See id. at 541.
40. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 30 (2011) (on file with au-
thor). Other studies have found “parental requirement” to be the reason for migration
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The girls’ responses to their parents’ decisions varied greatly.
Some girls, for example, saw nothing wrong with their parents’ deci-
sion and were more than willing to contribute to the family finances.41
Others resented the decision for a number of reasons, including: it
interrupted their school attendance,42 they missed their family and
wanted to go home,43 and they felt it was wrong of their parents to
expect children to work to support the family.44
“Exodus Factor” or the “Bright-Lights Syndrome”: A growing num-
ber of the girls are migrating to the South as a result of what has
been called the “Exodus Factor”45 or the “Bright-Lights Syndrome.”46
Unrelated to any cultural, religious, or even economic reason, the
exodus factor is simply the “follow the crowd” rationale in that “every-
one is leaving so I must also leave.”47 The impetus for this decision
is often greatly influenced by the perception that it is easy to “get
rich” working in the markets—a conclusion evidenced by the (com-
parative) wealth in goods and money girls proudly display when
they return to their villages for visits.48 Further, some girls report
for as many as half of the girl kayayei in Kumasi; see also Kwankye, Migration—Parental
Investment, supra note 8, at 540–41.
41. For example, many of the girls were proud of their ability to contribute to the family
finances. As one sixteen-year-old girl said, “I am the oldest so it is my responsibility to help
my parents cater for my brother and sisters. This is how we are.” Sheryl Buske, Kayayei
Survey, Book 3 #011412 (2011) (on file with author).
42. For example, a fifteen-year-old girl who had previously started primary school,
but was unable to complete it because her parents sent her to work in the markets, was
unhappy with her parents because “I should be in school now instead of in the market.”
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #020912-145F (2011) (on file with author).
43. A twelve-year-old girl who had been sent to the markets by her “auntie” more than
a year before said she would “be happy to go home as I miss my mother and my sister.
I feel sad without them.” Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 4 #031112 (2011) (on file
with author).
44. For example, one fourteen-year-old girl who had been working in the markets for
more than three months felt it is a parent’s responsibility to see to children instead of
children having to provide for the family. She said, “[c]hildren should not be made to
work to survive.” Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 6 #021912-249M (2011) (on file
with author).
45. Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 13–14.
46. Ruth Payne, Voices from the Street: Street Girl Life in Accra, Ghana, 16 (Ctr. for
Dev. Areas Research, Dep’t of Geography, CEDAR Research Paper No. 40, Jan. 2004)
available at http://www.streetchildren.org.uk/_uploads/Publications/3.Voices_from_the
_Street_-_Street_Girl_Life_in_Accra,_Ghana.pdf.
47. Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 13–14.
48. Id. at 14; see also MAX ASSIMENG, SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF GHANA: A STUDY IN
PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE 228 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that historically, amenities such as
water and electricity, movies and readily available goods were only available in the cities);
JOHN ANARFI ET AL., DEV. RESEARCH CTR. ON MIGRATION, GLOBALISATION & POVERTY,
VOICES OF CHILD MIGRANTS: “A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW LIFE IS” 14 (2005) avail-
able at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/MigrationGlobPov/Voices_of_Children
.pdf (quoting a thirteen-year-old kayayoo who “developed the desire to come to Accra
after observing those who have returned to my home town from Accra. They have nice
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that even when they do not want to join the crowd going south, they
are often pressed, even forced, to go by parents and family who want
the same money and goods they see other girls who have gone to the
cities sending home to their families.49 There is “considerable pres-
tige,” i.e., bragging rights, to having been to the city—whether per-
sonally or being related to someone who has.50
Similarly, many girls say they migrated because they wanted
their independence.51 In fact, independence was the second most
common reason given for migrating, after parental requirement.52
“Fostering” System: There is another aspect of the Ghanaian
culture, a practice particularly common among the Dagomba, the
largest ethnic group in Northern Ghana,53 which greatly contributes
to young girls migrating to the southern cities to work as kayayei.54
The practice is to “give” young girls to extended family members,
primarily paternal aunts, as a way of strengthening family ties.55
The “giving” of the girls effectively ends parental responsibility for
them and imposes that responsibility onto the aunts who are ex-
pected to raise the girl as their own.56 As the economic situation in
the North has deteriorated, the practice has become strained. Very
often the aunts send the girls to work in the markets on their own.57
Alternatively, the aunts “give” the girls to third parties who are
supposed to look after them as they work in the markets.58 These
girls are often treated as bonded labor and subjected to all forms of
abuse and neglect.59
clothes, straightened hair and a lot of things like utensils and sewing machines . . . so
I decided to come so that I can also get these things”).
49. Interview with Sister Olivia, Director Street Children Project Drop-In Center,
Kumasi, Ghana (Nov. 1, 2011) (on file with author); see also Kwankye, Migration—
Parental Investment, supra note 8, at 536.
50. ASSIMENG, supra note 48, at 228 (noting how someone returning to the village
after being in the city is the “centre of attraction”); see also Beauchemin, supra note 18,
at 25 (noting the peer pressure involved when the girls visit their villages wearing
miniskirts, high heels, and make-up).
51. Beauchemin, supra note 18, at 28.
52. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 30 (2011) (on file with
author).
53. IBRAHIM MAHAMA, HISTORY AND TRADITIONS OF DAGBON, at i (2004).
54. Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 13.
55. Id.; MAHAMA, supra note 53, at 146–47.
56. Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 13; MAHAMA, supra note 53, at 146–47.
57. Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 13.
58. Interview with Sister Olivia, Director Street Children Project Drop-in Center,
Kumasi, Ghana (Nov. 11, 2011) (on file with author); see also Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah,
supra note 3, at 13.
59. For example, the author got to know one little girl who regularly came to the
Street Children’s Project Drop-In Center fairly well. “N” was about five or six years old
and had been given to one “auntie” who later passed her onto another “auntie” who
eventually took her to Kumasi. Her “job” was to look after the auntie’s nine-month-old
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There is also a variation on the “fostering” system. Recognizing
that the word “[s]lavery is a loaded term, particularly in Africa,”
some researchers have identified a practice they argue amounts to
a modern day version of slavery.60 More and more often young girls
are arriving in the markets after their parents or guardians have
“given” the girl to a “madam” who promises to employ the girl for a
period of time—usually two years—and then send her to a voca-
tional training school or provide her with things such as sewing
machines.61 Accounts by the girls themselves, however, reveal that
very few of them ever actually receive the promised reward.62 In-
stead, before the two years expire, the girls will be thrown out or
will run away because the situation has become intolerable.63
Escaping Abuse or Arranged Marriages: Finally, some girls
migrate without their families’ knowledge, consent, or blessing be-
cause they are running from abuse and/or neglect.64 Almost fifteen
percent of the girls interviewed reported they left home because of
abuse from their parents or other relatives.65 Several girls noted
that even though their lives on the street are difficult, they prefer
it over living at home where they were abused. For example, a
sixteen-year-old girl who had been working on the street for almost
a year said, “at least here I am free from my aunt’s abuse.”66
A smaller number of girls said they migrated to avoid an ar-
ranged marriage. Arranged marriages are particularly common
among the Dagomba.67 The marriages are arranged by the parents,
often without any prior relationship between the two people, and
can be arranged when the couple are still children.68 The girls
son. At the auntie’s house, “N” was responsible for feeding and bathing the infant and
doing his laundry. During the day, while the auntie worked in the market, “N” spent
most of her day at the NGO center looking after the baby. Center staff nominally kept
an eye on her and the baby, but she was mostly left on her own to look after the child.
When the Center was closed, “N” spent the time sitting with the infant in the sun on the
curb at a busy intersection. When asked about the “auntie,” she stated that she had
never seen her before the day when the first auntie gave her to the woman. “N” is a
sweet child with heavily kohled eyes; she misses her mother and wants to go home.
Interview with Sister Gladys, Social Worker, Street Children’s Project, Kumasi, Ghana
(Nov. 21, 2011) (on file with author).
60. Beauchemin, supra note 18, at 37.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 30 (2011) (on file with
author).
65. Id.
66. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 8 #012912-112F (2011) (on file with author).
67. Who Are the Dagomba, GHANA NEWS-SPYGHANA, http://www.spyghana.com/who
-are-the-dagomba (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
68. Id.
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sometimes see running away to work in the markets as a way to
avoid an arranged marriage.69 As one fifteen-year-old girl explained,
“I do anything I like without family interference now. I was forced
to marry a man I never loved but now I have made my own choice
of the man to be with forever.”70
2. Their Life in the City
Kayayei have been research subjects for more than two decades,
however, the research has only recently begun to specifically focus
on girl kayayei. A basic profile was developed first, and then more
recent research began to focus on the girls’ day-to-day lives in the
streets.71 Slowly, a multidimensional picture of the girls is emerg-
ing. As others have noted, “[f]igures and dry facts, however, do not
do justice to the rich diversity of street children’s backgrounds, nor
to the poignancy of some of their stories.”72
Demographic Characteristics: The girls come primarily from the
three northern regions of Ghana—the Northern Region, the Upper
East Region and the Upper West Region.73 These are the most eco-
nomically deprived regions.74 As the Dagomba are the largest ethnic
group in the North, it is not surprising that the majority of the kayayei
girls are Dagomba.75 Most of the girls are older adolescents—more
than half are between fifteen and eighteen years old;76 younger
69. For example, one sixteen-year-old girl said, “[m]y life at home was better than
this but I was escaping an early marriage and it was necessary to leave.” Sheryl Buske,
Kayayei Survey, Girls Book 6 #021512-56M (2011) (on file with author).
70. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Girls Book 64 #0201412-92F (2011) (on file with
author).
71. See Opare, supra note 31, at 33.
72. Beauchemin, supra note 18, at 32.
73. Opare, supra note 31, at 42 (concluding that almost eighty percent of the kayayei
are from the northern regions); Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 10
(concluding that sixty percent of the kayayei girls were from the Northern Region). These
findings are consistent with the author’s survey which revealed that slightly more than
sixty-five percent of the girls were from the Northern Region. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei
Survey, Responses to Question 8 (2011) (on file with author).
74. For example, eighty percent of the people living in three northern regions are poor
and seventy percent are extremely poor. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2,
at 6; see also UNICEF, NATIONAL REPORT GHANA: GLOBAL STUDY ON CHILD POVERTY
AND DISPARITIES 18 (2009), http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Ghana_reportdesign
_July2010.pdf (noting that poverty actually declined in Ghana since the early 1990s
except in the northern regions where it has actually increased).
75. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 8.
76. For example, see id. at 10; Theresa Yaaba Baah-Ennumh et al., The Living Con-
ditions of Female Head Porters in the Kumasi Metropolis, Ghana, 3 J. SOC. & DEV. SCI.
229, 234 (2012). This is consistent with the author’s survey, which found the girls ranged
from nine to eighteen years old, that the largest groups of girls (eighteen percent) were
seventeen years old and the average age of the girls was 14.2 years. Sheryl Buske,
Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 2 (2011) (on file with author).
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girls—between ten and fourteen years old—account for roughly
thirty percent of kayayei girls.77 Although some of the girls have lost
both parents, most of the girls have parents they remain in touch
with on a regular basis.78 A significant number of the girls had never
been to school.79
Daily Working Life: Their working days are long, typically eight
to twelve hours per day, six days a week.80 The girls report they
typically earn between one and five cedis (less than three USD) per
day.81 They generally work in the markets or bus stations—anywhere
someone will likely need something carried.82 They negotiate their
fees on a customer by customer basis.83 Fees are based on the dis-
tance the goods must be carried as well as the weight and size or
bulkiness of the load.84 There is a preference for porters who are not
77. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 11–12. The physical demands
of kayayei work tend to prevent the youngest and the smallest girls from working. The
job requires the ability to carry heavy loads long distances over a difficult terrain. Young
girls generally do not have the necessary strength and/or balance. Additionally, young
girls have a difficult time attracting customers because of the preference for older girls.
78. The author’s survey found that roughly eighty percent of the girls have living
mothers and slightly more than a third of them had been in contact with their mother
within the last thirty days. Likewise, about sixty percent of the girls have living fathers,
but only about fifteen percent of the girls had spoken to their fathers in the last thirty
days. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 4–7 (2011) (on file with
author). But see Oberhauser & Yeboah, supra note 9, at 27 (finding the percentage of
girls between eleven and fifteen was only about eleven percent in a study of kayayei girls
conducted in Accra).
79. Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 9; Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies,
supra note 2, at 11–12; Kwankye, Migration—Parental Investment, supra note 8, at 538;
Girl Child Labour in Agriculture, Domestic Work and Sexual Exploitation: Rapid
Assessments on the Cases of the Philippines, Ghana and Ecuador, 1 INT’L LABOUR OFFICE
231 (2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=339
(citing research which determined that, in the northern three regions, more than seventy
percent of girls six years old and older had never been to school in contrast to the national
average of about thirty-five percent); Kwame Akyeampong, Revisiting Free Compulsory
Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) in Ghana, 45 COMP. EDUC. 175, 187 (2009) (noting
that as many as forty percent of six to eleven-year-old children were out of school as com-
pared to the national average of fifteen percent). Similarly, the author’s survey revealed
more than half (fifty-five percent) had never been to school, twenty-seven percent had
started primary school, but only nine percent had completed primary school. Sheryl Buske,
Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 11 (2011) (on file with author).
80. Roughly sixty percent of the girls worked eight to twelve hours per day and the
majority (sixty-eight percent) worked six days a week. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey,
Responses to Question 24, 25 (2011) (on file with author).
81. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 26 (2011) (on file with
author).
82. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 14.
83. Sheryl Buske, Field Notes, Mar. 5, 2012 (on file with author); see also Agarwal
et al., supra note 19, at 251.
84. See Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 251 (stating the girls carry all manner of
things on their heads). For example, the author routinely saw girls carrying live chickens,
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also carrying a child on their backs.85 Indeed, the presence of a child
makes it doubly difficult for the girl to attract customers because she
is often perceived to be weaker, less able to carry heavy loads or go
longer distances.86 She is also often thought to be clumsier, putting
the goods at risk of damage if she falls or stumbles.87 During the fee
negotiations and over the course of the job, the girls are often physi-
cally and verbally abused.88
Because the girls need every job they can get, they will rarely
turn down a job to carry a load regardless of the size and/or weight
of it or the distance it must be carried.89 Consequently, the “onus”
to decide that a particular job is too much for a young girl rests with
the customer who has a competing interest in obtaining the lowest
price which is usually obtained from the youngest girls.90 This
means the youngest and smallest often carry loads that are simply
too big or too heavy for their young bodies.
Life on the Streets: The girls face numerous risks living and
working on the streets. The primary risks are socio-economic and
are mainly related to their living conditions.91 For example, the girls
often struggle to make enough money in a day to buy food.92 They
also face difficulties in securing a safe place to sleep at night.93 They
sewing machines, fruits and vegetables, shoes, undergarments, charcoal, and boxes of
canned food. Sheryl Buske, Field Notes, Nov. 9, 2011 (on file with author).
85. Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 251.
86. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Mar. 5, 2012
(on file with author).
87. Id.; see also Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 251.
88. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Mar. 5, 2012
(on file with author); see also Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 251; Opare, supra note 31,
at 44 (describing exchanges between the kayayei and their women customers as some of
their “bitterest experiences” and providing an example of a woman customer who boarded
a bus and drove away after throwing only half of the agreed upon fee out the window at
the girl).
89. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 14.
90. Id. The girls point out, though, that “children under 18 are not strong enough to
carry most loads and if they accidently spoil it, they are severely beaten.” Sheryl Buske,
Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Mar. 5, 2012 (on file with author).
91. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 13.
92. The biggest expense for the girls is food with nutritional value. Sheryl Buske,
Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 28 (2011) (on file with author). Obtaining “good”
food that they can afford is difficult for them. The girls mostly rely on precooked food
because they don’t have cooking facilities of their own. Food that is purchased on the
street, locally known as “chop,” is often unsafe and makes them sick. Alternatively, it
tends to be very high in carbohydrates, but without any other real nutrition. Sheryl Buske,
Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Dec. 5, 2011 (on file with author).
As one girl noted, “I do not eat and feel healthy as I did at home.”
93. Accommodation which provides protection from the elements and safety which
they can afford is a constant challenge. They are especially vulnerable to attacks and
robberies during the night from people in the community as well as police and security
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face near daily harassment from government officials, other kayayei,
and the public.94 The girls are almost equally divided about whether
they feel safe working on the streets during the day—roughly one-
third feels safe “most of the time,” another third feels safe “always,”
and the final third “never” feels safe on the streets during the day.95 In
contrast, however, the majority of the girls “never” feel safe at night.96
3. Why They Stay
Despite the hardships of living on the streets, almost all of the
girls have been on the streets longer than they planned or expected
to be.97 Similarly, the majority of the girls said their life is better
living on the street than it was at home.98 For example, a fifteen-
year-old girl summed up the feelings of many when she said, “[l]ife
here is a challenge, but it is still better than home where I was
always beaten.”99 Sadly, the “sober and sometimes uncomfortable
fact is that for many children, the street is often a better place than
a home . . . .”100
guards. In an effort to secure safe accommodation, some girls resort to trading “sex for
sleeping places.” The absence of safe accommodations also makes it difficult for them to
store their personal belongings. Consequently, many girls own nothing that they cannot
carry with them during the day. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-
In Center, Dec. 5, 2011 (on file with author); see also Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies,
supra note 2, at 13, 22 (identifying “no proper places to sleep” as one of the problems the
girls face and discussing how some shopkeepers exploit the girls by charging them to
sleep on the verandah in front of the shop); Mariama Awumbila et al., Socio-Cultural
Dimensions of Migration in Ghana, at 42 (Centre for Migration Studies Technical Paper
No. 3, 2011) (noting the daily earnings of kayayei are usually not enough to cover their
accommodation, food and health care costs and, consequently, they often sleep in groups
out in the open); Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 3 (identifying four distinct
types of accommodation used by kayayei: 1) shared rented kiosks; 2) squatting in un-
finished buildings; 3) storefronts or sidewalks; and 4) with relatives).
94. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Questions 78, 80 (2011) (on file with
author).
95. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 78 (2011) (on file with
author).
96. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 80 (2011) (on file with
author). The girls say they are more vulnerable at night because they are attacked when
they are sleeping. Many girls sleep with small knives or razors tucked underneath them
for protection. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Mar.
5, 2012 (on file with author).
97. Ninety percent of the girls say they have been on the street longer than they
expected or intended. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 32 (2011)
(on file with author).
98. Sixty percent of the girls say their life is better on the streets than it was at home.
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 107 (2011) (on file with author).
99. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 8 #022212-67F (2011) (on file with author).
100. KAMAL FAHMI, BEYOND THE VICTIM, THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF EMPOWERING
CAIRO’S STREET CHILDREN 124 (2007).
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The girls give two primary reasons for staying on the streets
instead of returning home: financial independence and their “free-
dom.”101 For girls who come from extreme poverty, earning their own
money is a powerful experience. Likewise, for many of the girls, the
city offers new and exciting experiences they would never have in
their traditional and conservative villages. For many, it is the first
time they have had access to shopping, movie theatres, nightclubs, 
and socializing with men and boys.102 Compared to life in their
villages where most would be working on farms, married, or “doing
nothing,” it is not surprising that so many of the girls choose to stay
on the streets.103
II. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF KAYAYEI AS “STREET KIDS”
The global presence of children living and working on the streets
in urban areas has been well-documented.104 Much of that effort has
been concerned with trying to determine just how many children are
on the streets.105 One of the difficulties in making that determina-
tion, though, has been the difficulty in arriving at a common defini-
tion of who is a street child and should therefore be counted.106
One of the most commonly cited definitions is the UNICEF
definition that developed from early work done in Latin America
which defines street children as “any girl or boy . . . for whom the
street (in the widest sense of the word, including unoccupied dwell-
ings, wasteland, etc.) has become his or her habitual abode and/or
source of livelihood; and who is inadequately protected, supervised,
or directed by responsible adults.”107 Over time, other definitions
focused on whether children were “on” or “of” the street: children
“on” the streets are children who work on the streets during the
101. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 33 (2011) (on file with
author). Other reasons for staying longer than planned were 1) had not yet earned
enough money to leave; 2) parents/ family would not permit them to return; and 3) afraid
to go home.
102. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Feb. 17,
2012 (on file with author).
103. Id.
104. CONSORTIUM FOR ST. CHILDREN: LITERATURE REV., STREET CHILDREN: A MAPPING
& GAPPING REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2000–2010, at 6, available at http://resourcecentre
.savethechildren.se/library/street-children-mapping-gapping-review-literature
-2000-2010.
105. Id. at 6–8.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id. (quoting B. GLASSER, HOMELESSNESS IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (New York:
Maxwell 1994)).
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daytime but return to their families at night while children “of” the
street are defined as children who live on the street full-time.108
Terminology has continued to evolve.109 It is now generally
agreed that the term “street children” tends to carry negative con-
notations.110 The Committee on the Rights of the Child now uses
“children in street situations,” rather than street children, signaling
the reality that children engage in a variety of activities on the street
and that the “problem” is with the situation and not the child.111
Research has also moved away from “discrete categories of street
lifestyles”112 towards an understanding of children on the street as
children who are “out of place”113 or, alternatively, that children on
the street should be viewed as social actors in their own right.114
Research and definitional trends aside, the Ghanaian public
rarely see the girls as individuals and instead lumps them all to-
gether as amorphous “street children” based on little more than
their mere presence on the street and their shared appearance in
dirty and torn clothing.115 Indeed, in the over 1100 community sur-
veys about public perception of kayayei conducted by the author in
Kumasi, Ghana, during the 2011–2012 academic year, the second
most common response when asked for a one-word description of
kayayei was “street child.”116 Once lumped together as “street chil-
dren,” it becomes easy for the public to then pigeonhole them as
either criminals/deviants (in the case of girls, as prostitutes), victims
(typically orphans) or, sometimes, working entrepreneurs.117 Once
conceptualized broadly as street children, and more specifically as
criminals/deviants, victims, or entrepreneurs, the labels then be-
come their “identity” and legitimizes how the public views them and
interacts with them.118
108. Id. (citing C. SZANTON BLANC, URBAN CHILDREN IN DISTRESS: GLOBAL PREDICA-
MENTS AND INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES (Luxembourg: Gordon and Breach 1996)).
109. UNHCR, PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND/OR
LIVING ON THE STREET 10 (2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues
/Children/Study/OHCHRBrochureStreetChildren.pdf.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 10.
112. CONSORTIUM FOR ST. CHILDREN, supra note 104, at 9 (quoting C. Panter-Brick,
Street Children, Human Rights, and Public Health: A Critique and Future Directions,
31 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOL. 147, 150 (2002)).
113. Id. at 9–10.
114. Id. at 10.
115. A common theme thread across the descriptions of kayayei was that they “all look
alike.” Sheryl Buske, Community Survey (on file with author).
116. The most common response, by a very slight margin, was “poor.” Sheryl Buske,
Community Survey. Responses to Question 20 (on file with author).
117. UNHCR, supra note 109, at 28.
118. Id. at 31.
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Some have argued that because many kayayei maintain rela-
tionships with their families, kayayei should not be considered street
children.119 Given the negative connotations that are often attached
to a “street child” label, it is a tempting argument. Still, the exis-
tence of relationships with their families is but one factor,120 and not
determinative, as to whether they are part of a larger group of street
children, especially given the other realities of their lives. They live
and work on the streets and are, for the most part, without adult
supervision or assistance and therefore fall within most definitions
of street children, even if they are not a “typical” street child.121 And,
given that the inclusion of kayayei in the broader understanding of
“street child” establishes their eligibility for assistance and program-
ing,122 it is worth asking if it is a disservice to exclude them from the
definition of street children. Still, in light of the history and cultural
practice surrounding kayayei, they must be understood to hold a
unique and special position in the broader spectrum of street children.
A. As Deviants: Prostitutes and Thieves
The most common public perception, globally, of street children
is overwhelmingly negative, that they are nothing more than “hooli-
gans, vagabonds, and criminals.”123 Tellingly, as one street child ex-
plained, “[h]ardly anyone calls us by our own names.”124 Instead, the
language used to refer to them reflects a general contempt, including,
for example: saligomans (used in Rwanda to refer to “nasty kids”);125
pajaros fruteros and las pinanitas (used in Peru to refer to street
children as fruit birds because they steal fruit from the markets and
piranhas, respectively, because of their practice of moving as one
119. Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 248.
120. See CONSORTIUM FOR ST. CHILDREN, supra note 104, at 9.
121. See id. at 9.
122. See UNHCR, supra note 109, at 14.
123. JOE L. P. LUGALLA & COLLETA G. KIBASSA, URBAN LIFE AND STREET CHILDREN’S
HEALTH: CHILDREN’S ACCOUNTS OF URBAN HARDSHIPS AND VIOLENCE IN TANZANIA 3
(2003); see also Peter Anthony Kopoka, The Problem of Street Children in Africa: An
Ignored Tragedy 6, INT’L CONFERENCE ON ST. CHILDREN AND ST. CHILDREN’S HEALTH IN
EAST AFR. (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.streetchildren.org.uk/uploads/Publications
/11.The_Problem_of_Street_Children_in_Africa.pdf (noting that society tends to view
them as “troublemakers, a nuisance or menace” that must be removed from the street).
124. MARIE WERNHAM & CONSORTIUM FOR ST. CHILDREN, AN OUTSIDE CHANCE: STREET
CHILDREN AND JUVENILE JUSTICE—AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 13 (2004), available
at http://www.crin.org/resources/infodetail.asp?ID=4382.
125. Nadine Innes, EMPOWERING PEOPLE TO LIVE THE LIFE THEY LOVE, Self Esteem
Among Street Children in Chennai City (Jan. 21, 2013), http://beyondsolutions.net
/?p=1785.
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against their “prey”);126 and moineaux (a pejorative term used in
the DRC analogizing them to sparrows because they eat food on
the street).127
In Ghana, kayayei have been described in negative terms. More
specifically, it is often asserted, with great confidence, that kayayei
are “prostitutes,”128 “thieves,”129 “pickpockets,”130 and “liars.”131 Even
when the kayayei are not painted as prostitutes, thieves, and other
criminals, the negative perceptions abound. Kayayei are routinely
referred to as “impolite” and “rude,”132 “stupid,”133 and “crazy.”134
Public criticism of the kayayei is the norm and typical of public per-
ception of street children in general. Several survey participants
summed up the general feeling in the community as “everybody
hates them.”135 The vehemency of the criticism, though, is particu-
larly interesting given that the overwhelming majority of the people
surveyed (ninety-three percent) stated they had never had a bad or
negative experience with a kayayoo.136 One wonders, then, why they
felt so strongly, and were so sure of their perceptions. Of the handful
of participants who did report having had a bad experience with a
kayayoo, almost half of those (forty-six percent) were related to fee
disputes.137 Only a few (thirty-four percent) reported that a kayayoo
had stolen something from them.138 No one reported an incident
involving prostitution.
The girls, too, report that they are treated badly more often
than not by the general public.139 Indeed, when asked who or what
presented the greatest danger or difficulty on the streets, the
overwhelming response (seventy percent) was “people in the
126. DANIELLE SPEAKMAN, NOTHING BUT A THIEF: THE STREET AND HER CHILDREN
53 (2002).
127. Innes, supra note 125.
128. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Responses to Question 20 (on file with author).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 3 #22112-4 (on file with author).
133. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 3 #030712-10 (on file with author).
134. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #011112-33 (on file with author).
135. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 3 #21312-7 (on file with author). Many
survey participants seemed to use “kayayoo” and “prostitute” synonymously, noting that
“all,” “most of,” and “every” kayayoo is a prostitute.
136. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Responses to Question 18 (on file with author).
137. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Responses to Question 19 (on file with author).
138. Id.
139. For example, a fifteen-year-old girl said, “[p]eople are never nice to me here. The
[sic] treat us harshly.” Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 6 #021812-23M (2011) (on
file with author). Likewise, another twelve-year-old girl said, “[p]eople treat us badly here
on the streets so if I [sic] an alternative place to go, I would be happy.” Sheryl Buske,
Kayayei Survey, Book 1 021712-142M (2011) (on file with author).
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community.”140 The girls report being shouted at, insulted, beaten,
and generally treated badly on a daily basis—as one sixteen-year-
old kayayoo put it, “[w]e are not safe on the street because of the
maltreatment from the community.”141 In addition to physical and
verbal abuse, the girls also report being regularly cheated by cus-
tomers.142 The general feeling from the girls is that the community
“hates us”143 and “doesn’t respect and regard us as humans.”144
Another interesting aspect of the general dislike and maltreat-
ment of kayayei is the emphasis placed on the girls being from the
North. Over and over the community noted, generally with a great
deal of disdain, that the kayayei are “not from [Kumasi]” or that “they
are not one of us.”145 The implication was that whatever was “wrong”
with the kayayei, it could be explained by the fact that they were not
Ashanti, the dominant tribe in the Kumasi area.146 While this re-
sponse might have been predictable in the context of immigrants
and refugees from other countries who are sometimes viewed as a
drain on local resources, it was somewhat surprising, however, that
this degree of hostility was in response to other Ghanaian citizens,
particularly children. Some argue, however, that this tension between
the North and South has become part of the “national culture.”147
The girls view this as “tribalism,” a form of discrimination.148
According to them, this plays out in a couple of significant ways.
First, the girls from the North say it is harder for them to get jobs
because people “don’t like” the girls from the North.149 It is also
harder for them to negotiate everything from places to sleep to the
140. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 101 (2011) (on file with
author).
141. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 13 (noting “disrespectful
treatment and insults” from their customers).
142. A sixteen-year-old girl reported that the community “beats us and treats us badly.
Sometimes they cheat us by not giving us the money bargained for.” Sheryl Buske,
Kayayei Survey, Book 6 #91SB (2011) (on file with author).
143. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3 #021912-232M (2011) (on file with author).
144. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #149PSA (2011) (on file with author). One
girl recounted an incident on the street: “I was walking and a man asked me to walk
faster. I was not feeling well and could not. He pushed me to the ground and went
around me.” Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3 #94PT (2011) (on file with author).
145. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 2 #21612-1 (2011) (on file with author).
146. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey (2011) (on file with author).
147. Iman Hashim, Exploring the Linkages Between Children’s Independent Migration
and Education: Evidence from Ghana, 10 (Dev. Research Ctr. on Migration, Globalisa-
tion & Poverty, Working Paper T-12, 2005), available at http://www.migrationdrc.org
/publications/working_papers/WP-T12.pdf (citing Ann Whitehead, Poverty in the North-
East Ghana, OVERSEAS DEV. AGENCY 32 (1996)).
148. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Dec. 5, 2011
(on file with author).
149. Id.
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price of food.150 According to them, the general bias against them
makes everything harder because “they have no regard for people
from the North.”151
The bias is not limited just to the general public. Instead, Ashanti
girls working as kayayoo regard the girls from the North as un-
wanted “competition” for limited jobs and do not want them there.152
The girls from the North say they are regularly beaten and attacked
by Ashanti kayayei.153 As one Dagbona girl from the North reported,
“[t]hey will never regard you as a sister or daughter when you wrong
them if they notice you are a northerner or any other tribe apart from
Ashanti.”154 The Ashanti girls seem to agree, noting “[t]he community
is quite ok as to how they treat us. Those from the Ashanti region,
due to tribalism, are normally favored over those northerners.”155
A final layer that emerged from the community surveys was the
public’s feeling that the girls “should just go home.”156 Many com-
munity survey respondents were of the opinion that the kayayei
were not only unwanted in Kumasi, but also that they had no one
to blame but themselves for whatever they experienced and/or en-
dured.157 At the same time, though, when asked why the girls come
to the cities to work as kayayei, the most common response (thirty-
five percent) was that the girls were orphans and had no other
option.158 To the extent the public believes the girls are orphans, to
where and to whom, exactly, should they return? One survey re-
spondent explained by pointing out that “[e]ven though it isn’t their
fault they are orphans, they should find something else to do instead
of kayayoo. If they make the bad decision to be kayayoo, it is their
fault what happens to them. Not all orphans have to be kayayoo.”159
150. Id.
151. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #020612-20F (2011) (on file with author)
(showing a fifteen-year-old girl from the Northern Region who has been working and
living on the streets for more than three months); see also Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey,
Book 6 #021812-230M (2011) (on file with author) (showing a fifteen-year-old girl from
the Northern Region who said “[p]eople are never nice to me. They treat us harshly. I
think it is because I am from the North.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3 #021712-
166M (2011) (on file with author) (showing that a fifteen-year-old girl from the Northern
Region noted, “[p]eople are not always nice to me and it makes me sad.”); Sheryl Buske,
Kayayei Survey, Book 1 #021712-139M (2011) (on file with author) (“People are very rude
to me because I am a Northerner.”).
152. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Dec. 5, 2011
(on file with author).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey Book 5 #0202212-21F (2011) (on file with author).
156. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey (on file with author).
157. Id.
158. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Responses to Question 6 (on file with author).
159. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #030112-10 (on file with author).
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Some say the kaya business was once viewed as an “honourable
trade.”160 Public criticism, predicated on the belief that the girls are
thieves and prostitutes,161 is now the norm. It is true that some
kayayei engage in theft and prostitution as survival strategies, but
it is also true that they are often themselves the victims of crime.
More than half of the girls surveyed reported they had been physi-
cally attacked, robbed, or sexually assaulted while on the street.162
B. As Victims: Orphaned and Exploited
The second most common public perception of street kids is that
they are victims, usually because they have been orphaned or ex-
ploited in some way.163 This view of street kids is sometimes “over-
romanticized by the press and charity groups, and . . . [portrays
them] as the passive victims of a ruthless society,”164 which, in turn,
often produces a “rescue” mentality.165
Likewise, in Ghana, there is also, to a much lesser extent, a view
of the kayayei as victims. According to the public, they are innocent
victims because they are either orphans166 or they are exploited
and forced to work as kayayoo.167 Descriptions of the girls in this
vein tend to emphasize their vulnerability, including: “young,”168
160. Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 257.
161. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey (on file with author); see also Agarwal et al.,
supra note 19, at 257 (noting “urban legends” about girls who have stolen customers’
goods).
162. Nineteen percent of the girls have been attacked, twenty-six percent have been
robbed and eight percent have been sexually assaulted while working on the streets.
Incidents of sexual assault are likely under-acknowledged because talking about sexual
violence is considered “taboo” in Ghana. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to
Question 84, 85 & 86 (2011) (on file with author); see also Beauchemin, supra note 18,
at 11.
163. See UNHCR, supra note 109, at 12; CONSORTIUM FOR ST. CHILDREN, supra note
104, at 13 (noting that younger children are more likely than adolescents to be perceived
as victims).
164. CONSORTIUM FOR ST. CHILDREN, supra note 104, at 13 (quoting H. Beady, The
Construction and Protection of Individual and Collective Identities by Street Children
and Youth in Indonesia, 13 CHILDREN, YOUTH AND ENV’TS 1 (2003)).
165. See UNHCR, supra note 109, at 12.
166. “Orphan,” in the African context, is not restricted to children who have lost both
parents; it is also used to refer to children who have lost only one parent. E.g., UNICEF,
CHILDREN IN GHANA, supra note 14, at 154 (stating that “[l]osing one or both parents . . .
creates orphans . . .”).
167. See Kwankye et al., supra note 1, at 6 (describing the view that children’s migra-
tion leaves them vulnerable to exploitation as “generally held”); see also Opare, supra
note 31, at 43 (stating that women and girls in the kaya business had to move south due
to “very limited opportunities”).
168. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #022712-3 (on file with author).
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“poor,”169 “exploited,”170 “on their own,”171 and “without any help
from anyone.”172
To the extent that the public views them as victims, helping the
girls is seen as an imperative and almost exclusively as the govern-
ment’s responsibility.173 In addition to the general “government
should help them” responses,174 some respondents felt the govern-
ment should take specific actions, including:
• the government should provide free vocational training
and/or free education175
• the government should create more jobs176
• the government should offer financial incentives to
stop working as kayayoo177
• the government should create and/or enforce child
labor laws178
• the government should provide proper housing for
them179
Alternatively, the view that the girls are being exploited led a fair
number of respondents to suggest that someone must be punished—
either the parents/ families, or the people who hire them.180 Others
felt educating parents and families about the dangers of working as
a kayayoo, instead of punishment, is a more productive response.181
The public perception of the girls as victims due to orphanhood
is somewhat at odds with what the girls themselves report. Almost
eighty percent of the girls interviewed reported their mother is
living, and almost half of them had spoken to their mothers in the
last thirty days.182 Of their fathers, roughly sixty percent of the girls
reported their father is living, although only about twenty-five per-
cent of the girls reported speaking to their fathers within the last
169. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #022412-7 (on file with author).
170. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 1 #012212-11 (on file with author).
171. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 1 #121811-29 (on file with author).
172. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #011812-17 (on file with author).
173. There was also a thin thread of responses suggesting that “society,” churches, and
NGOs bear some of the responsibility for helping the girls. Sheryl Buske, Community
Survey (on file with author).
174. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 3 #011212-13 (on file with author).
175. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 3 #30312-21 (on file with author).
176. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 3 #40712-4 (on file with author).
177. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 4 #111911-18 (on file with author).
178. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 4 #111911-31 (on file with author).
179. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #020912-13 (on file with author).
180. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #031312-9 (on file with author).
181. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 6 #031912-11 (on file with author).
182. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 4, 5 (2011) (on file with
author).
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thirty days.183 In sum, almost ninety percent of the girls reported
living mothers and fathers, leaving only slightly more than ten per-
cent of the girls to report being double-orphans, or “true orphans”—
having neither parent.184 Still, the fact that about forty percent of
the girls reported their father is deceased is significant and has com-
plex policy implications, particularly in Ghana’s patrilineal societies
in which children “belong” to fathers.185
For the girls who have lost both parents, who are “true” or-
phans, the situation is dire. Many of those girls say they must “fend”
for themselves or “who else would?”186 As many of them point out,
what other option do they have?187
The opinions of the girls themselves, as to whether they are
being exploited are far from straightforward. In a culture where
children’s rights are rarely part of the national dialogue, a surpris-
ing number of the girls talk in terms of children’s rights.188 While
the girls rarely, if ever, used the language of exploitation, many of
them talked in terms of how working in the streets, often at the
behest of parents and extended family, for the benefit of the family,
deprived them of their rights.189 As one fourteen-year-old girl said,
“[c]hildren should not be made to work to survive.”190 This viewpoint
most often came up in the context of a discussion about Ghana’s
child labor laws and whether the laws were good laws.191 The girls
were almost equally divided about whether the labor laws are “good
laws.” The girls who believed the labor laws are “good laws” focused
on how a prohibition on working would affect them in positive ways,
183. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to Question 6, 7 (2011) (on file with
author).
184. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey (2011) (on file with author).
185. ASSIMENG, supra note 48, at 77–78 (noting patrilineal systems are common in the
northern regions of Ghana—the regions from which the majority of the girls working in
the streets as kayayei come from. In a patrilineal system, children “belong” to their fathers
and father’s family. Consequently, it is the father and, in his absence, the father’s family,
which bears the responsibility of caring for a child).
186. For example, a seventeen-year-old girl who had been on the streets for more than
six months due to the death of both parents stated, “who else would take care of me if
I don’t take care of myself.” Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Girls Book 6 #021812-203M
(2011) (on file with author).
187. As a sixteen-year-old girl who had lost both parents sadly pointed out, “[ b]eing
an orphan, no one sees it as a responsibility to take care of you.” Sheryl Buske, Kayayei
Survey, Book 6 #021812-203M (2011) (on file with author).
188. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey (2011) (on file with author).
189. For example, a thirteen-year-old girl who had been sent by her mother to work in
the markets said, “[w]orking in the market] is against our rights. We should be in school.”
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 8 #011912-109M (2011) (on file with author).
190. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 6 #021912-249M (2011) (on file with author);
see also Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3 #021712-162M (2011) (on file with author).
One young girl who had been on the streets for more than year and whose parents sent
her to work in the streets said, “children should not be made to work for their living.”
191. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey (2011) (on file with author).
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including making it more likely they would go to school or at voca-
tional training.192 Alternatively, the girls who believed the labor laws
prohibiting them from working are “bad laws” tended to view the pro-
hibition as improper interference with their need or wish to work.193
The right most often cited by the girls is their right to education.
For example, as one young girl who has lived on the street full-time
for more than two years succinctly put it, “[c]hildren under 18 should
be in school which is free and we should all enjoy it to the fullest. It
is our right.”194 Others simply noted that “children have a right to
education”195 or that “children should be in school but not working
on the streets.”196 One seventeen-year-old girl went further: “Our
future stands to be destroyed if we start work under 18 instead of
keeping in school.”197
On the other hand, having a responsibility, or obligation, to con-
tribute to family finances was a common thread across the responses.
This is not surprising in a society that values family relationships
and obligations to each other. Indeed, as one Ghanaian sociologist
noted, among the common aspects across Ghanaian culture are:
• a tendency towards conformity—“the blatant eschew-
ing” of individual ideas;
• an “unquestioning acquiescence” to men of influence,
particularly fathers and village elders;
• a lack of self-reliance as a result of the “pervading in-
fluence” of extended family.198
Time and again the girls referred to their own desire to contribute
to family finances. For example, one seventeen-year-old kayayoo said,
“[c]hildren should willfully help in upkeep of families”199 and another
adolescent girl said “children should work to help their parents.”200
192. For example: Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 8 #012512-112M (2011) (on file
with author).
193. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 8 #021512-98M (2011) (on file with author).
194. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201812-278F (2011) (on file with author).
195. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 7 #020812-112M (2011) (on file with author);
see also Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 7 #021712-157M (2011) (on file with author);
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 2 #020712-67F (2011) (on file with author) (noting
“[c]hildren have the basic right to education.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 2
#020712-71F (2011) (on file with author) (“Education is the basic right of children.”).
196. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 7 #020812-109M (2011) (on file with author).
197. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201012-173F (2011) (on file with author);
see also Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 4 #020712-94M (2011) (on file with author)
(“All children should have chance to be in school.”).
198. ASSIMENG, supra note 48, at 114–15.
199. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201012-107F (2011) (on file with author).
200. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201012-169F (2011) (on file with author);
see also Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 2 #020912-150F (2011) (on file with author)
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Other girls seemed to view contribution to general family fi-
nances as an unwelcome requirement, an obligation even, amount-
ing to exploitation. One twelve-year-old girl who has been living on
her own and working on the street full-time for more than three
months and who has never been to school emphasized the obligation
to family when she said, “[w]e have to help our parents take care of
the family.”201 Given no choice in the matter, this young girl’s par-
ents sent her to Kumasi from her village, on her own, at the age of
eleven to work in the streets and send her earnings back home.202
Another young girl put the responsibility for care squarely, and
bluntly, on parents: “[c]hildren should be cared for by their parents
and should not have to work to support them.”203 These are not iso-
lated examples—many girls told similar stories of being forced to
work for someone else’s benefit.204
Others viewed the requirement that they must contribute to
expenses directly related to them, most often their education, as a
form of exploitation. It is not surprising that many Ghanaian par-
ents push the responsibility for funding their own education onto
their daughters. Ghanaians have historically seen little value in
formal education for girls “since their functions in society were
clearly mapped out, with presumed less intellectual demands.”205
While ideas about educating daughters have changed over time,
some traditions die hard.206 For example, when asked why she has
remained on the streets long after when she thought she would
return home, one young girl replied that she had “not earned enough
money for my school fees yet” and that her parents would not let her
return home until she had earned enough money to pay her school
(insisting that “children can work to assist their parents.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei
Survey, Book 1 #0201712-267F (2011) (on file with author) (“My parents are poor and I
work to help support them.”).
201. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201012-179F (2011) (on file with author).
202. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201012-179F (2011) (on file with author).
203. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3 #021612-119M (2011) (on file with author).
204. For example, a twelve-year-old girl who has been on the streets for more than a
year “want[s] to stop working but I can’t because I have to have the money for my family.”
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 6 #021912-247M (2011) (on file with author); see also
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3 #021512-77M (2011) (on file with author) (“Children
should be taken care of by adults and not by themselves.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey,
Book 4 #021512-164F (2011) (on file with author) (“My parents don’t have money to take
care of us. I work to support myself and younger siblings.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei
Survey, Book 4 #020612-13M (2011) (on file with author) (“A child should not be made
to work for a living.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 4 #020712-84M (2011) (on file
with author) (“I want to stop working on the street but my family won’t allow it.”); Sheryl
Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 1 #0201112-195F (2011) (on file with author) (“We have to
help our parents take care of the family.”).
205. ASSIMENG, supra note 48, at 125.
206. Id. at 125–26.
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fees.207 She had initially planned to work in the market for six to
nine months but had been on the street full-time for more than two
years.208 Again, this was not an uncommon scenario.209
C. As Entrepreneurs: Independent Agents
Finally, an emerging perception of working street children is
related to recognizing their right and ability to make decisions and
act for themselves. This perception arguably stems from a culture
that “readily tolerates the exploitation of children.”210 In this vein,
working street children are often viewed as entrepreneurs whose
efforts have a legitimacy that should not be dismissed just because
they are children.211 Some have argued that “[c]hildren’s work is not
unavoidably synonymous either with ‘exploitation’ or ‘abuse’ of
children . . . .”212 Instead, it should be considered from their per-
spective as they may feel very differently about their work than we
do.213 This has a particular significance in Ghana where working in
support of the family is seen as “an integral part of the socialization
of children.”214 It is expected that children will support their parents
in taking care of the family.215 Indeed, it is “part and parcel of the
fabric of Ghanaian society.”216
207. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #020812-278F (2011) (on file with author).
208. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #020812-278F (2011) (on file with author).
209. For example, Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 7 #021712-150M (2011) (on file
with author); see also Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3 #021312-11M (2011) (on file
with author) (noting that a seventeen-year-old girl who had been on the streets more than
year said, “[i]f I stop working, I can’t gather enough money to continue my education.”);
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3 #021312-17M (2011) (on file with author) (“I want
to make enough money to continue studying.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 3
#021512-75M (2011) (on file with author) (“If I am stopped from working on the streets,
how do I earn money to pay my school fees to continue my education?”); Sheryl Buske,
Kayayei Survey, Book 4 SB14 (2011) (on file with author) (“I have never been to school, but
I want to learn to be a dressmaker, but my parents can’t afford to buy a sewing machine.
I work to get money to buy a machine so I can learn to sew.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei
Survey, Book 8 #020612-52M (2011) (on file with author) (“I wish I did not have to work
on the street for my school fees.”).
210. MINISTRY OF EMP’T & SOC. WELFARE, NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION (NPA) FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOUR IN GHANA 2009–15, at 31 (Nov. 2009).
211. See MANFRED LIEBEL, A WILL OF THEIR OWN: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON
WORKING CHILDREN 9 (2004).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 79, at 215.
215. GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., supra note 7, at 4.
216. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 79, at 215; see also PROSPERA TEDAM, CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS INT’L, CHILD DOMESTIC LABOUR—THE INVISIBLE THIEF OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN
GHANA 2 (2013), available at  http://www.childjustice.org/index.php/component/edocman
/?view=document&id=132&Itemid=471 (noting that “culturally” Ghanaian children are
expected to assist with household chores as well as commercial activities of the family).
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The kayayei in Ghana are in some ways the classic example of
children’s work. Many community survey respondents approved of
girls working as kayayoo, even as a substitute for formal education.217
They described the girls as “hardworkers,” “girls doing a hard job,”
and “trustworthy.”218
Traders and other people with business interest in the markets
are especially supportive of the girls. In a market setting where
everything must be carried in and out on foot,219 a supply of workers
willing and able to carry the merchandise is essential. An abundance
of young girls willing to do so means that there will always be com-
petition for jobs, which in turn, keeps costs low. Traders view the
girls’ willingness to “hustle” as a benefit to the girls by allowing them
to be self-sufficient and to the traders by keeping their costs down.220
The girls who viewed themselves as free agents were a group
clearly and unequivocally separate from the girls who worked, volun-
tarily or otherwise, to support their families. These girls were fiercely
proud of themselves and their ability to provide for themselves.
They can be very disciplined about earning and saving money—
sometimes forgoing food and/or medicine to save more money.221
Some say they take risks sleeping in the open instead of paying for
accommodations because they want to save the money.222 Earning
their own money is a powerful experience for some of them. They
are often willing to overlook the difficulty of living and working on
the streets in exchange for the money they are earning.223 Many of
the girls were working toward specific “targets” and planned to re-
turn home after they met their target amount.224 Others intended to
keep working in the markets and had no plans to return home.225 As
one fourteen-year-old said, “I came here of my own accord to make
money and I don’t plan to stop.”226
217. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #021012-6 (on file with author); Sheryl
Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #020612-8 (on file with author); Sheryl Buske, Com-
munity Survey, Book 2 #021312-10 (on file with author).
218. Sheryl Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #21612-18 (on file with author); Sheryl
Buske, Community Survey, Book 2 #021512-1 (on file with author); Sheryl Buske,
Community Survey, Book 4 #020412-09 (on file with author).
219. Opare, supra note 31, at 43–44.
220. Interview with “Mercy,” Kejetia Market Trader, Kejetia Market, Kumasi, Ghana
(Mar. 6, 2012) (on file with author).
221. Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Feb. 13, 2012 (on file with
author).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 6 #021612-125M (2011) (on file with author).
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Additionally, the girls’ comments focused over and over again
on their “right” to make their own decisions and objected to their
decisions being questioned by anyone else. They see themselves as
“independent individuals who can judge and design their lives
themselves and can contribute something to society.”227 The girls
were particularly proud, and somewhat defensive, of their ability to
decide for themselves minor day-to-day things such as when and
what to eat, with whom to socialize, and what to wear.228 This is not
terribly surprising given that so many of them come from traditional
communities where much about their day-to-day lives is prescribed
and determined by others.229 Throw in normal adolescent develop-
ment and the desire for independence and autonomy and it is easy
to understand why the girls value their “freedom” so much.230 As one
young girl who looked about ten years old and who had been living
and working on the streets for more than one year, said: “I have my
own freedom to do whatever I want now.”231
III. GHANA’S PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSE
Ghana has developed extensive public policies with respect to
child labor, education and health care. For the most part, the poli-
cies fall within the three main public policy models based on the
intent, or purpose, of the policy: protectionist, punitive, and a human
227. LIEBEL, supra note 211, at 22.
228. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center Feb. 13, 2012
(on file with author).
229. See Opare, supra note 31, at 35.
230. For example, see Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201912-336F (2011)
(on file with author) (recording a fourteen-year-old girl’s declaration that, “I have free-
dom to work and decide what to eat. And I get to see city life.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei
Survey, Book 5 #020812-272F (2011) (on file with author) (noting a seventeen-year-old
girl who said, “I feel some sense of maturity and the ability to take care of myself.”); Sheryl
Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201812-301F (2011) (on file with author) (noting a
fourteen-year-old girl, who had been on the streets more than six months, said “I can
now buy clothes I want from my hard work.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5
#0201912-332F (2011) (on file with author) (noting that an eleven-year-old girl said “I
can work and spend money on food I like.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5
#21812-288F (2011) (on file with author) (recording a fifteen-year-old girl, who had never
been to school, stating that, “I earn a lot of money and also have freedom for myself.”);
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201712-245F (2011) (on file with author) (noting
a fourteen-year-old girl who had been on the streets for more than two years who said,
“I work for my money and I can choose what to eat, when and how to spend it”); Sheryl
Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 6 #021712-159M (2011) (on file with author) (noting a
seventeen-year-old girl who had never been to school, who stated, “[n]ot all children
want to go to school. I am an example.”).
231. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 5 #0201712-237F (2011) (on file with author).
She didn’t know her actual age, but looked to be about ten years old.
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rights model.232 While evident in the kayayei context, with some
modification, there are huge gaps between policy intent and imple-
mentation. The gap can be explained, in part, by the perceptions of
the kayayei as criminals, victims, and entrepreneurs by the very
people tasked with implementing the policies.
A. Public Policy Models
In 1994 the Council of Europe identified three models of public
policy approaches towards street children.233 Each of the models
is based on distinct conceptualizations and assumptions.234 The
models are:
1. Correctional, punitive or repressive model: this model
conceptualizes street children as deviants who pose a
threat to the general public and results in a repressive
or punitive response;
2. Rehabilitative or protection-oriented model: this model
conceptualizes street children as victims and empha-
sizes the deficiencies of street life, the violation of street
children’s rights and is protectionist in response;
3. Human-rights model: this model conceptualizes street
children as a group who has been discriminated
against.235
While the Council of Europe’s classifications were developed in
the context of a broad understanding of “street children,” they are
adaptable to the narrower context of girl kayayei.236
There are few, if any, public policies that are specific, and
limited, to kayayei, and even fewer of the public policies can be
neatly and exclusively placed within one of the models. There also
tends to be some overlap and/or blending between models. Specifi-
cally, in the context of kayayei, the protectionist and human rights
models tend to merge.237 Additionally, in the context of girl kayayei,
232. CONSORTIUM FOR ST. CHILDREN, supra note 104, at 34.
233. The third classification proposed by the Council of Europe is a human rights
model. This model conceptualizes street children as a group of people who have been dis-
criminated against. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 35.
236. The kayayei and “street children” face many of the same problems and both groups
run the risk of exploitation. Many of the protections meant for “street children” could
benefit the kayayei.
237. This might be explained by the fact that, to the extent that violations of girl
kayayei rights are seen as human rights violations, they are usually framed as a viola-
tion of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which is inherently a
human rights document.
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I would borrow from the field of economics and add an additional
classification, a laissez-faire model. Literally translated, laissez-
faire means “let them do as they will” or “leave them alone.”238 In
the economics field, it is understood to mean that private citizens
should be allowed to engage in commercial transactions with little
to no government interference or assistance.239 Much of Ghana’s pub-
lic policy regarding girl kayayei embraces this principle, neither
intentionally helping nor hindering the girls. Consequently, I would
borrow the Council of Europe’s classifications, but also suggest that
Ghana’s public policies with respect to girl kayayei more accurately
fall into one of three models:
1. Correctional, punitive or repressive model;
2. Rehabilitative, protectionist/Human rights model;
3. Laissez-faire model.
B. Kayayei and Public Policies: A Mix of Punitive,
Protectionist, and Laissez-Faire Policy Models and
the Obstacles to Implementation
Whatever the intent of the policy might have been, the gap be-
tween the intent and its implementation has meant that the kayayei
girls have largely not benefitted from the child labor, health, and
education policies. Instead, because of the public perceptions of the
girls, not only have they not benefitted, they are often penalized.
1. Child Labor Laws and Policy
The public largely views the kayayei as a “street children” issue.
The Government of Ghana, on the other hand, has framed the kayayei
as a child labor issue, and more specifically, one of the worst forms
of child labor (WFCL).240 In 2009 the Ministry of Employment and
Social Welfare (MESW) undertook an ambitious multi-stakeholder
study of child labor in Ghana which resulted in the National Plan
of Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour in
Ghana (NPA).241 The overriding goal of the NPA is to “reduce the
238. Jeffrey Tucker, What Is Laissez-Faire?, DAILY RECKONING (Dec. 14, 2011), http://
dailyreckoning.com/what-is-laissez-faire/.
239. Id.
240. MINISTRY OF EMP’T & SOC. WELFARE, supra note 210, at 15. The NPA has identified
nine types of child labor as “worst forms” and prioritized those for elimination: portage
of heavy loads (kayayoo), child trafficking, fisheries, mining and quarrying, ritual servi-
tude, commercial sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, agriculture, street hawking,
and begging. Id.
241. The NPA falls under the umbrella of the Medium Term Development Policy
Framework (MTDPF) relevant to children’s welfare. Id. at 13.
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worst forms of child labour to the barest minimum by 2015, while
laying strong social, policy and institutional foundations for the
elimination and prevention of all other forms of child labour in the
longer term.”242 The government
recognizes the serious nature of the child labour problem, its im-
pact on the rights and welfare of our children, and its negative
consequences for a number of important national goals in areas
such as education . . . human resource development, poverty
reduction, our drive to attain middle income status by 2015, as
well as the alleviation of vulnerability and social exclusion.243
The NPA’s ultimate conclusion was that despite multiple laws
and policy measures that have been put in place over the last ten
years that should ensure the realization of “the constitutional pro-
visions and moral obligations for the protection of children” from the
worst forms of child labor, including kayayei,244 they “have remained
disjointed, and progress towards the achievement of the underlying
goals has been uneven and inadequate in many areas.”245
The primary policy response to kayayei has been through pro-
tectionist child labor laws which are principally concerned with
gatekeeping—setting out who can and cannot work—but less so
with enforcing the gatekeeping measures. The labor laws do not
address, however, the bigger issues such as why the girls are mi-
grating to the cities in droves and/or finding meaningful alterna-
tives for them. In addition, large portions of the general population
are unaware of child labor laws and/or how the public should re-
spond to violations.246 Moreover, many of the officers charged with
implementing the laws have little to no understanding of the laws.247
Ghana has ratified several international instruments which
address child labor, including: the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention (No. 182) (ILO 182),248 the ILO Minimum Age Convention
(No. 138) (ILO 138),249 the Convention on the Rights of the Child
242. Id. at 21.
243. Id. at 12.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. MINISTRY OF EMP’T & SOC. WELFARE, supra note 210, at 25.
247. Id. at 26.
248. Ratifications of C182—Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182),
INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300
_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
249. Ratifications of C138—Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), INT’L
LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300
_INSTRUMENT_ID:312283 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
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(CRC)250 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child (Charter).251 The Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560), although not
yet fully operational,252 is the primary domestic authority for child
labor laws253 and incorporates the rights detailed in the interna-
tional instruments. With respect to kayayei, the Act provides that
“[n]o person shall engage a child in exploitative labor.”254 Labour is
“exploitative” if it “deprives the child of its health, education or de-
velopment.”255 Furthermore, it sets eighteen as the minimum age for
engagement in “hazardous work”256 which is defined as work that
“poses a danger to the health, safety or morals of a person.”257 Finally,
“hazardous work” specifically includes “porterage of heavy loads.”258
Enforcement of these provisions is the responsibility of Social
Services.259 If, after investigation, Social Services is “reasonably
satisfied” there has been a violation in the informal sector, Social
Services “shall” report the matter to the police who “shall” investi-
gate the allegation and “take the appropriate steps to prosecute the
offender.”260 If, however, the offender is a family member of the ex-
ploited child, Social Services “shall request” that a probation officer
or a social welfare officer prepare a “social enquiry report” instead
of reporting the matter to the police.261
The Act’s labor provisions are essentially protectionist, but a
closer look, particularly at the enforcement provisions, reveals a lim-
ited punitive aspect. First, certain types of work (i.e., “exploitative”
and “hazardous”) are prohibited in an effort to protect children’s
250. See 1577 U.N.T.S., http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11
&chapter=4&lang=en (showing Ghana ratified the treaty on February 5th, 1990).
251. See Ratification Table, AFR. COMM. OF EXPERTS ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF
THE CHILD, http://acerwc.org/ratifications/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
252. MINISTRY OF EMP’T & SOC. WELFARE, supra note 210, at 22 (noting, for example,
that implementation of Child Panels at the district level is still pending in many places).
253. There is also a limited reference to “young persons” in the Labour Act of 2003 (Act
651), but is framed as employer’s responsibilities to youth workers in the formal sector.
Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), §§ 58–61.
254. The Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560), § 87(1) [hereinafter The Children’s Act].
255. Id. § 87(2).
256. Id. § 91(1). Alternatively, § 90 sets the minimum age for “light” work at fifteen.
“Light” work is defined as work “which is not likely to be harmful to the health or devel-
opment of the child and does not affect the child’s attendance at school or the capacity
of the child to benefit from school work.” Id. § 90(2).
257. Id. § 91(2).
258. Id. § 91(3).
259. The Children’s Act, supra note 254, § 96(1).
260. Id. § 96(3).
261. Id. § 96(4). This process is considerably different from the process used when there
are allegations of violations in the formal sector. There, the initial investigating party is
a district labour officer. If the labour officer is “reasonably satisfied” there has been a
violation, he “shall” report the matter to the police for investigation. Id. § 95(3).
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“health, education [and] development.”262 And, responsibility for in-
vestigating allegations of violations in the informal sector rests with
the Department Social Welfare Officer and the Social Services Sub-
Committee of the District Assembly instead of a police/prosecutorial
body.263 The enforcement provisions, however, trigger different re-
sponses depending on who is the offender. Non-relative employer
offenders face prosecution, but relative offenders merely trigger the
request of a “social enquiry report.”264 The different approach for the
relative/non-relative is interesting in that, while the offense (exploi-
tation of the child) may be exactly the same, non-relatives trigger a
punitive response but relatives trigger a protectionist response
through social services intervention. Still, putting aside that aspect
of enforcement, the overall tenor of the child labor laws is protec-
tionist in nature: there is no provision for punitive action against
the child and the bright-line age criteria for admission to kaya work
is inconsistent with free market ideas and ignores the girls’ own
decision-making ability.
The bigger issue is the enforcement of the labor laws at the
street level. For many of the kayayei girls, the idea that the laws,
which prevent them from working, are intended to protect them is
laughable.265 Instead, they see the prohibitions, and their “enforce-
ment,” as punitive. From their point of view, there are two major
problems with prohibitions on their working. First, the prohibitions
allow, perhaps even encourage, exploitation and corruption.266 All
market traders and workers, including kayayei, must purchase daily
“tickets” to be “legally” permitted to work in the markets.267 The
tickets are purchased from the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly
(KMA) and cost twenty cents.268 Anyone working in the markets can
be stopped and required to produce their daily ticket; anyone unable
262. Id. § 87(2) & 91(2).
263. Id. § 96(1).
264. The Children’s Act, supra note 254, § 97(4).
265. For example, when asked if the labor laws are a good thing, the incredulous re-
sponse was often along the lines of “[t]he law does not help the child, it helps the KMA.”
Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 8 #020812-128F (2011) (on file with author).
266. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Dec. 12, 2011
(on file with author); see also MINISTRY OF EMP’T & SOC. WELFARE, supra note 210, at 16
(citing “institutional weakness in the application of child labour laws” as one of the causes
of child labor in Ghana).
267. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Dec. 12, 2011
(on file with author). See also Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 14–15
(noting that, in order to be permitted to work in the markets, the kayayei must pay a
daily toll to the authorities).
268. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Dec. 12, 2011
(on file with author).
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to produce a valid ticket is subject to being fined.269 The girls report
that they generally have no problem purchasing their tickets, even
though they should not be permitted to do so because they are under
eighteen.270 They are able to easily purchase the tickets because they
pay a “tax.”271 The tax is a little extra money, locally known as “small-
small,” for the KMA officer who sells the ticket.272 The girls despise
the practice, but say that they could not get their tickets otherwise.273
The girls pin their tickets to their clothes where they will be
visible. In this way, they say, they are usually not bothered by KMA
officers because “everyone knows” they have already paid their tax.274
Sometimes, though, the girls report that they are easy targets—
especially the younger ones—because the KMA officers will take
their head pans if they haven’t bought a ticket or they can’t pay
another “tax” to a second, or third, KMA officer.275 The loss of their
head pan is a serious problem for the girls. Replacing a pan, or paying
for a lost rented one, can be more than an entire week’s earnings.276
Consequently, their pans are one of their most prized possessions
and they rarely let it out of their sight, even while sleeping they curl
around it or use it for a pillow.
The labor law is intended to protect children. The requirement
of the daily ticket is meant to regulate who can work in the markets
and to raise city revenue. Instead, it creates a situation in which
individual KMA officers have complete control over whether a child
is able to purchase a ticket and work. To be sure, some KMA officers
enforce the law and do not sell tickets to children.277 Other KMA
officers, guided by a sense of compassion and the desire to “help,”
will sell the tickets to the girls.278 Other KMA officers use their
position to exploit the girls by demanding “small-small.”279 From
their perspective, kayayei are only prostitutes and thieves and are
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Dec. 12, 2011
(on file with author).
275. Id.
276. Id. According to the girls, new pans cost between fifteen and twenty cedis (approx-
imately eight to eleven USD). For most of the girls, this represents approximately one
week of earnings.
277. Interview with “Kwame,” KMA Officer, Kumasi, Ghana (Feb. 18, 2012) (on file
with author).
278. Id.
279. Id.
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lucky not to be arrested.280 In this way, the threat of withholding a
ticket, or charging extra for it, becomes the stick with which the
girls are beaten.281 Thus, the law that was intended to protect them
often fails to do so because of individual KMA officers’ perception of
the girls.
Many of the girls also say the labor laws pose an even bigger
problem than the daily “tax” and hassles from the KMA.282 Those
without any adult support ask, often poignantly, what else can they
do to survive?283 Indeed, as they point out, the law prevents them
from working, but there is very little in the way of meaningful alter-
natives for them. These girls are very much aware that there is vir-
tually no safety net for them and believe that they have no choice
but to “fend for ourselves.”284 They view the laws that prohibit them
from working, without providing realistic alternatives for them, as
punitive—another strike against them in their already difficult life.
2. Education Policy
Ghana’s education policy is a rights-based policy. In the days
leading up to the “new” 1992 Constitution, policymakers believed
that education was an “unequivocal” right and that tuition oper-
ated as a barrier which kept some children from exercising their
right to an education.285 At that time, roughly thirty percent of the
school age children in Ghana were not attending school.286 The 1992
Constitution reflects this rights-based approach to education and
280. Id.
281. See Agarwal et al., supra note 19, at 257 (noting that protectionist legislation can
“operate as an extra burden upon children, leaving them open to extortionate practices
on the part of minor officials”).
282. Sheryl Buske, Focus Group, Street Children Project Drop-In Center, Dec. 12, 2011
(on file with author).
283. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 8 #0201112-181F (2011) (on file with author)
(stating “sometimes there’s just nothing else for people like me”).
284. For example, Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 8 #012912-112M (2011) (on file
with author) (stating “I don’t have anyone to help me”).
285. Kwame Akyeampong, Revisiting Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education
(FCUBE) in Ghana, 45:2 COMP. EDUC. 175, 181 (2009); see also Angela W. Little, CON-
SORTIUM FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. ACCESS, TRANSITIONS AND EQUITY, ACCESS TO BASIC
EDUCATION IN GHANA: POLITICS, POLICIES AND PROGRESS 12–21 (2010), available at
http://www.create-rpc.org/pdf_documents/PTA42.pdf (providing a detailed and fascinat-
ing history of education reform in Ghana).
286. Athena Maikish & Alec Gershberg, TARGETING EDUCATION FUNDING TO THE POOR:
UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION, EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL LEVEL
OUTCOMES IN GHANA, EFA GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2009, at 6, available at http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001804/180410e.pdf.
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provides “basic education shall be free, compulsory and available
to all.”287
In 1996, in an effort to meet the constitutional mandate,288 the
Ministry of Education launched Ghana’s flagship education policy,
the Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education program, more
commonly known as FCUBE.289 The FCUBE attempted to do two
essential things: improve the quality of teaching and improve the
infrastructure of the schools.290 These reforms were to be carried out
during the provision of a “free” education.291 Nonetheless, many school
districts continued to charge “administrative fees” as a way to create
funding for school repairs and other needs.292 Essentially, the “ad-
ministrative fees” provided the “extra” resources for schools beyond
the minimal amount provided by the government.293
In 1999, frustrated with the continuation of fees in some schools,
failure to meet enrollment targets, and poor school supervision at
the local level, the Ministry shifted its initial focus from improved
teaching and infrastructure to decentralizing the country’s educa-
tion system and introducing capitation grants.294 Capitation grants
are government funds which are provided to schools on a per-child
basis based on enrollment.295 It is meant to increase enrollment by
removing the financial barrier to school and to compensate schools
for revenue lost through elimination of fees.296 Nonetheless there are
still significant barriers to education for kayayei girls.
Actual Cost: One of the reasons kayayei girls have not benefited
from the FCUBE is because even though education is “free” and stu-
dents no longer pay tuition, the “real cost” of education is much more
than just the tuition.297 The “real cost” includes the actual cost of
school supplies, uniforms and book bags, lunch costs and transpor-
tation costs—none of which are part of the FCUBE tuition waiver.298
287. GHANA [CONSTITUTION] May 8, 1992, art. 25(1)(a).
288. Id. art. 38(2) (requiring that the government “shall within two years after Parlia-
ment first meets after the coming into of this Constitution, draw up a programme for
implementation within the following ten years, for the provision of free, compulsory and
universal basic education”).
289. Maikish & Gershberg, supra note 286, at 5.
290. See id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See id.
294. Id. at 6–7.
295. Maikish & Gershberg, supra note 286, at 7.
296. Id. at 9.
297. Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 15.
298. Id. at 15–16.
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These costs, while perhaps manageable for one or two children, be-
come prohibitive for many large families.
Being forced to earn money to contribute to their school expenses
is common among the girls. For example, one twelve-year-old who had
only been working on the streets for less than a week explained that
after her school shoes were stolen, her mother withdrew her from
school and told her she had to work until she earned enough money
to replace them.299 She estimated that it would take her at least six
months to earn enough money to replace the shoes.300 Others tell
similar stories about working to earn money to purchase “stationary”
(school supplies) or uniforms.301
Opportunity Cost: A second reason kayayei have been mostly
left out of FCUBE’s success is because of “lost opportunity” costs
associated with children attending school.302 These costs include the
loss of wages from a child who is not working, the loss of childcare
provided by a child who attends school, the loss of unpaid labor and,
in many cases, the cost of a delayed bride price.303 These are very
real costs that families must make up for if their daughter goes to
school instead of to work.
Cultural Reluctance/Resistance: A third reason kayayei have
seen little benefit from the FCUBE is that, simply put, educating
girls is often seen as a waste of time and money. This is particularly
true in the northern regions where “traditional beliefs about women’s
status are the strongest . . . .”304 Instead, girls are often kept at home
to help their mothers and learn housekeeping.305 Additionally, it
isn’t considered “beneficial to invest in female education because most
of them do not perform well. What sense does it make to invest one’s
limited resources in a girl only for her to drop out of school for poor
performance or worse still, get pregnant?”306 More generally, in many
of the northern rural communities, people view education as either
299. Sheryl Buske, Field Notes, Nov. 9, 2011 (on file with author).
300. Id. A social worker who was present for this exchange said she doubted very much
that the child would ever return to school. According to her, the temptation of a regular
income typically overcame parents’ willingness to have their children return to school.
301. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Book 1 #201912-318F (2011) (on file with author)
(noting “I’m able to pay for some of my stationary now.”); Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey,
Book 8 #020312-112F (2011) (on file with author) (stating “[n]ow I can help my parents
pay for my school things”).
302. Yeboah & Appiah-Yeboah, supra note 3, at 15.
303. Id.
304. UNICEF, supra note 14, at 95.
305. Id. at 93; see also Kangsangbata, supra note 32, at 20 (noting that women are tra-
ditionally socialized to “ensure the healthy maintenance of their families”).
306. Kangsangbata, supra note 32, at 24.
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“meaningless” because children will only grow up to work on the
family farms, or as a threat to traditional lifestyles in that an edu-
cated child might leave the family farm for other opportunities.307
The FCUBE has the potential to make education assessable to
kayayei girls. Ultimately, though, whether they can exercise their
right to education depends on the answer to several key questions:
1. Is there the ability to pay the actual other costs?
2. Is there the ability to absorb the lost opportunity costs?
3. Is there a willingness to do both?
The answer to these questions, in turn, depends on whether there
is sufficient support for kayayei girls’ education. At present, there
is very little political or public will to do so. On the one hand, many
families cannot, or will not, prioritize long-term improvement through
education over the short-term gains of income from kaya work.308 On
the other hand, teachers and administrators charged with ensuring
the girls’ enrollment in school and their continued attendance share
many of the negative perceptions of the girls. As one headmistress
of a secondary school noted, “[g]etting [kayayei girls] enrolled is an
uphill battle. Even when we get them enrolled, they are behind
grade level and usually drop out. My teachers should be spending
their efforts on other children who want to learn.”309 This response
is telling—it reflects a lack of understanding of kayayei, including
that many of the gaps in the girls’ education causing them to be
behind grade level is due to their parents’ insistence that they go to
work.310 Sadly, it also reflects the public’s perception, or at least this
headmistress’ position, that some children are worthy of an educa-
tion and some are not—even though all Ghanaian children have a
constitutional right to an education.
3. Health Care Policy
Similar to its education policy, Ghana’s health policy recognizes
that health care is also a human rights issue.311 The national policy is
307. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 79, at 230.
308. MINISTRY OF EMP’T & SOC. WELFARE, supra note 210, at 36 (noting that many
families continue to value the short-term benefit from children’s work over the long-term
benefits of education).
309. Interview with “Mary,” Primary School Teacher, Kumasi, Ghana (Mar. 28, 2012)
(on file with author).
310. Kangsangbata, supra note 32, at 14–15.
311. See GHANA MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY 11 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.moh-ghana.org/UploadFiles/Publications/NATIONAL%20HEALTH
%20POLICY22APR2012.pdf.
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implemented through the National Health Insurance Act of 2003,312
which, in turn, established the National Health Insurance Scheme
(NHIS).313 The mission of the NHIS is “to ensure equitable universal
access for all residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality of essential
health services without out-of-pocket payment being required at the
point of service use.”314
The NHIS is a national system with decentralized operations;
each district has its own insurance fund which is financed at the
national level through levies against the VAT, Social Security and
the National Insurance Trust Fund.315 To enroll, members must
register and pay premiums through their district office.316 From the
beginning, several groups of people have been statutorily exempt
from the premium requirement, including:
A person who is:
a) under 18 years of age and both of whose parents or guardians
are contributors;
b) under 18 years of age and whose parent or guardian has been
proven by the scheme to be a single parent or guardian. . . is not
required to pay any contribution to a District Mutual Health
Insurance Scheme but is entitled in the case of a child to enjoy
the minimum benefits under the scheme as a dependent . . . .317
The language of this provision is somewhat misleading. It speci-
fies who may be enrolled without paying the premium. What isn’t
clear, though, is that because children whose parents enrolled them
via a household plan are not charged a premium, only those children
can be enrolled. In short, children whose parents were not enrolled
in a family plan were not eligible for enrollment.
This restriction was arguably lifted in 2009 when President
Mills made comments to the UN General Assembly that free
healthcare would be extended to all children.318 Whether all chil-
dren have, in fact, been eligible for free enrollment since 2009 is a
312. Joseph Mensah et al., Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme in the Context
of Health MDGs: An Empirical Evaluation Using Propensity Score Matching, RUHR
ECON. PAPERS (2009), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/rwi/repape/0157.html.
313. National Health Insurance Regulations, 2004 (LI1809): Schedule III—National
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS).
314. Mensah et al., supra note 312, at 6.
315. OXFAM INT’L, ACHIEVING A SHARED GOAL: FREE UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE IN
GHANA 18 (2011).
316. Id. at 21.
317. National Health Insurance Regulations, 2004 (LI 1809): Regulation 56—Exemption
from payment of contribution on basis of age.
318. OXFAM, supra note 315, at 18.
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contentious issue.319 It appears that some districts allowed it while
others did not.320
More promising is the newly enacted National Health Insurance
Authority 2012, Act 852.321 It expressly provides that all children
are now eligible for free enrollment regardless of their parents’ en-
rollment status.322 As yet, however, the Ministry has not announced
when it will be implemented. If past experience is any indication, it
will likely take months, perhaps years even.323
The NHIS has certainly made some impressive improvements
in the provision and quality of healthcare in Ghana. Like the gains
in education, though, the kayayei girls have benefited from them
very little due to eligibility and logistical obstacles which stem, in
part, from public perception.
Eligibility: Until 2009, it was clear that children could not be
enrolled in NHIS unless they were enrolled as family members
under their parent’s plan.324 After 2009, whether children could be
enrolled separately from their parents was a matter of much confu-
sion, even among Ghana’s top officials, and resulted in inconsistent
implementation across districts.325 Additionally, given the high rates
319. See NHIS Is Healthier Now Than Before—Sylvester Mensah, PEACE FM ONLINE
(Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.ghanamedicalassociation.org/v3/index.php/2013-03-15-11-35-36
/health-news/705-nhis-is-healthier-now-than-before-sylvester-mensah (quoting NHIS CEO
Sylvester Mensah as saying, “[s]ince 2009 children have been decoupled from their parents
and children have independent access to healthcare without recourse to their parents”);
President Mahama Slams NPP Healthcare Promise, GHANA ELECTION 2012 (Oct. 22,
2012), http://www.africanelections.org/ghana/news_detail.php?nws=6786&t=President
%20Mahama%20slams%20NPP%20healthcare%20promise (quoting President John
Mahama as saying “the New Patriotic Party’s proposal to provide free healthcare to chil-
dren under 18 years was in contrast to the National Health Insurance Authority law”);
Free Healthcare for Children—Nana Akuffo—Addo Declares, MODERN GHANA (Oct. 20,
2012), http://www.modernghana.com/news/425180/1/free-healthcare-for-children-nana
-akuffo-addo-decl.html (quoting New Patriotic Party (NPP) Presidential Candidate Nana
Akuffo-Addo as saying that NPP would offer all children free access to healthcare be-
cause “parents no longer have to be a subscriber to the NHIS for a child to benefit”).
320. Porters, Street Kids Registered for NHIS, MODERN GHANA NEWS (June 9, 2008),
http://www.modernghana.com/news/169028/1/porters-street-kids-registered-for-nhis
.html (reporting that about two thousand porters and street kids were registered with
the NHIS, presumably without parental enrollment); 10,800 “Kayayeis” Get Free Health
Care, NGO NEWS AFR. (Sept. 19, 2009), http://ngonewsafrica.org/archives/236 (reporting
a mass NHIS registration of over ten-thousand kayayei).
321. Sodzi Tettey, Ten Years of Health Insurance in Ghana, SODZI SODZI-TETTEY’S BLOG
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.sodzisodzi.com/2013/09/ten-years-of-health-insurance-in-ghana.
322. Report of the Committee of the Whole on the Proposed Formula for Disbursement
of the National Health Insurance Fund for the Year 2013, The First Session of the Sixth
Parliament of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, Mar. 27 2013, at 6.
323. Tettey, supra note 321.
324. See PEACE FM ONLINE, supra note 319.
325. OXFAM, supra note 315, at 18.
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of illiteracy among the kayayei, as well as language barriers, print
and radio campaigns meant to educate the public were largely inac-
cessible by the girls. Consequently, few of the girls realized they were
eligible to enroll in NHIS and most went without insurance. Imple-
mentation of the new Act 852 is likely to face the same challenges.
Logistics: Assuming that Act 852 settles the issue of children’s
independent eligibility, there are still logistical issues that work
against the kayayei girls enjoying the full benefit of the NHIS. First,
the NHIS has been criticized as “riddled with inefficiency” and that
the registration process is “poorly managed and slow,” administered
by “unprofessional poorly trained staff,” and people are faced with
long lines and repeat visits.326 That people have been known to “wait
months for their membership cards, without which they are not
entitled to benefits,” is an example of the program’s inefficiency.327
Further complicating the process is the lack of consistency across
districts, despite national guidelines which should facilitate nation-
wide consistency.328 While these issues are not limited to kayayei
girls, they make it all the more unlikely that a child could navigate
the process. This is particularly true when the child has little to no
formal education.329
Second, it is unlikely kayayei girls were enrolled before they left
their villages. Twenty-eight percent of Ghana’s population is consid-
ered “indigent,” however less than three percent of that group is
enrolled in the NHIS.330 The main reason given for failure to enroll
is the inability to afford the premium.331 Given the high concentra-
tion of poor households in the northern regions, it is not unlikely
that many of the kayayei girls came from households which were not
enrolled in NHIS.
326. Id. at 29.
327. Id.
328. Yogesh Rajkotia & Kevin Frick, Does Household Enrollment Reduce Adverse
Selection in a Voluntary Health Insurance System? Evidence from the Ghanaian National
Health Insurance System, HEALTH POL’Y & PLANNING 1, 2 (2011), available at http://heapol
.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/09/07/heapol.czr057.full.pdf (noting the existence
of “much heterogeneity” across districts).
329. Mensah et al., supra note 312, at 14 (noting that those with low levels of educa-
tion are less likely to enroll).
330. OXFAM, supra note 315, at 26.
331. Id. at 26 (noting this is the case for as many as seventy-seven percent of the
country’s total population, eighty-five percent for rural residents and ninety-one percent
for very poor households); see also Free NHIS Registration for People in Kassena
Nankana, GHANA BUS. NEWS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2013/02
/05/free-nhis-registration-for-people-in-kassena-nankana/ (reporting that many of the
people who registered during the registration campaign had allowed their policy to
expire because they could not affirm the premium to renew it).
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Additionally, for those who attempt to enroll separately from
their parents, they will likely have difficulty establishing eligibility
because they cannot provide proof of age.332 For kayayei girls, pro-
ducing a birth certificate can be problematic, even in the best of cir-
cumstances. It’s unlikely that they have a birth certificate because
it is unlikely that their birth was registered in the first place.333 For
example, between 1999 and 2003, the period during which many of
the kayayei were born, only about twenty percent of Ghana births
were registered.334 Moreover, even if they do have a birth certificate,
they are very unlikely to have taken it with them when they went
to the city. Without it, it will be difficult for them to enroll in NHIS.
Third, even if the kayayei girls were initially enrolled in the
NHIS, they must renew their policy every year.335 The process for
renewals, like the process for initial enrollment, is challenging and
inconsistent across districts. Some districts will not permit a re-
newal if the enrollee cannot produce a current membership card
while other districts will allow it.336 Some renewals have been
delayed due to an inability of NHIS staff to locate the enrollee’s
records. For kayayei girls, renewing their NHIS enrollment is just
not worth the working hours lost while waiting in long lines to see
an NHIS administrator and then to be told they don’t have the
proper documentation.
Finally, there is a great deal of general confusion and misunder-
standing regarding membership renewals. The confusion stems from
discussions in the media about the possibility of a one-time pre-
mium payment option that might become effective at some point in
the future.337 This is often confused with a one-time enrollment,
which will still require annual renewals. Unfortunately, many of
the media reports have confused the issue by using the language
332. See UNICEF, STRENGTHENING BIRTH REGISTRATION IN AFRICA: OPPORTUNITIES
AND PARTNERSHIPS TECHNICAL PAPER 5 (2010), available at http://www.unicef.org/esaro
/Technical_paper_low_res_.pdf (noting that “[e]ach year nearly fifty million children are
not registered worldwide”).
333. One indicator that kayayei girls do not have birth certificates is that so many of
them do not their own age. Indeed, the author’s Kayayei Study revealed that thirteen
percent did not know the age or birth date. Sheryl Buske, Kayayei Survey, Responses to
Question 2 (2011) (on file with author).
334. UNICEF, supra note 332, at 7; see also UNHCR, supra note 109, at 12 (noting
that children living on the street are “likely” to lose access to basic services because they
lack the required identity documents).
335. OXFAM, supra note 315, at 21.
336. Id. at 25.
337. Kumasi Morgan Owusu, Confusion Over NHIS One Time Premium, MODERN
GHANA NEWS (June 11, 2011), http://www.modernghana.com/news/331792/1/confusion
-over-nhis-one-time-premium.html.
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interchangeably and by failing to make clear when, exactly, the
change will go into effect.338
The NHIS system has resulted in improvements in the quality
and accessibility of health care in Ghana. In the past, eligibility
barriers prevented many kayayei girls from benefiting from NHIS.
The new law is intended to remove that barrier. Still, barriers to full
participation by kayayei girls continue to exist due to their lack of
understanding about their eligibility and administrative challenges
to enrolling.
CONCLUSION
North-to-South migration of young girls in search of kaya jobs
is increasingly common. Some have suggested that it is “an adaptive
response to poverty.”339 Indeed, some studies have concluded that
almost every house in some of the northern regions have lost at
least one girl to the kaya business.340
As the presence of the girls on the street continues to grow, it
is increasingly difficult for the public to continue to ignore them.
Instead, the public sees “street children” and responds to them as
criminals and victims, and to a lesser degree, working entrepreneurs.
Public perception of the girls has rendered much of the labor, educa-
tion and health policies of no use to them. In a country which strug-
gles with corruption and little and/or uncoordinated administrative
oversight, individual members of “the public” tasked with policy im-
plementation all too often allow their personal views to affect how they
do their job. To put it plainly, “the public” is made up of individual
teachers, secretaries, KMA officers, NHIS personnel, school admin-
istrators, and others. These are the very people who must implement
the policies. As long as the implementation of public policy is filtered
through individual biases, the kayayei girls will not benefit from
policies that are intended to reach all Ghanaian children. Bringing
about meaningful changes in public perception is a monumental task,
but it can be done; it has been done.
338. For example, in 2009 the media reported that “the latter part of 2010" was “fixed”
as the implementation date for the one-time premium, but the change has yet to go into
effect. Date Set for NHIS One-Time Premium, MODERN GHANA (Nov. 13, 2009), http://
www.modernghana.com/news/249058/1/date-set-for-nhis-one-time-premium.html. But
see NHIS One-Time Premium to Commence, MODERN GHANA (May 12, 2012), http://www
.modernghana.com/news/394914/1/nhis-one-time-premium-to-commence.html (citing Dr.
Kwabena Duffuor, Minister of Finance, as saying that the one-time premium was “certain”
to go into effect by the end of 2012).
339. Awumbila, supra note 4, at 3.
340. Kwankye et al., Coping Strategies, supra note 2, at 24.
